Abstract

This paper reviews what has been learned over many decades of foreign aid to education. It discusses what works and what does not and in this discussion draws attention to the fact that even a simple assessment requires more than providing a uniform check-list of inputs. It shows the positive contribution that aid has made to education in aid-recipient countries, the most tangible outcome of which is the contribution that aid makes to expanding enrolments especially of basic education. But the paper also indicates that there is a considerable gap between what aid does and what it could potentially achieve, especially in relation to its contribution to improvements in educational quality. Perhaps the paper’s most important conclusion relates to the contribution of aid to capacity development in education—on the one hand an issue of central importance, but on the other, one in which the record has been one of systemic weaknesses and failures and in which few lessons seem to have been learned. …/
.... This review shows that many of the lessons of what works in foreign aid to education are known, but they are not implemented. These lessons are of two sorts, the first cluster relates to the interface of aid with education systems in recipient countries. To make a difference, what is of paramount importance is to start at the level of the whole education sector—rather than to pick out the sub-sector most popular with donors and channel a disproportionate share of funds to make this ‘work’ better, for this distorts a government’s sector-wide planning.

The second cluster of lessons are those related to the ‘nuts and bolts’ of education systems themselves—what makes them work, how the different bits fit together and how aid monies can distort priorities, making the government’s co-ordination efforts difficult as well as creating fragmented accountability.

This review demonstrates the distortions caused by focusing on enrolments and insufficiently on quality, on products such as plans and educational management information systems (EMIS), and ‘inputs’, rather than processes and outcomes, what goes on in the classroom, what the students learn, whether the teachers’ pay and status are sufficient to keep them in the classroom and continuing to teach. Sustainable education outcomes will not be achieved merely by reproducing yet more successful, but individual projects. Perversely, development agencies which focus only on demonstrable short-term impact may well be contributing, unwittingly, to an undermining of long-term impact on the education systems and their deepening development, to whose progress they are trying to contribute.

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<th>Acronyms</th>
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<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADEA</td>
<td>Association for the Development of Education in Africa</td>
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<td>AED</td>
<td>Academy for Education Development</td>
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<td>AusAID</td>
<td>Australia’s Aid Program</td>
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<td>AIBEP</td>
<td>Australia-Indonesia Basic Education Programme</td>
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<td>BANBEIS</td>
<td>Bangladesh Bureau of Education Information and Statistics</td>
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<td>BEDP</td>
<td>Basic Education Development Plan</td>
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<td>BESSIP</td>
<td>Basic Education Sub-Sector Investment Program</td>
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<td>BRAC</td>
<td>Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee</td>
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<td>CETT</td>
<td>Centers of Excellence for Teacher Training</td>
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<td>DPEP</td>
<td>District Primary Education Programme</td>
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<td>ECCE</td>
<td>Early Childhood Care and Education</td>
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<td>EFA</td>
<td>Education for All</td>
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<td>EGRA</td>
<td>Early Grade Reading Assessment</td>
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<td>Education Management Information Systems</td>
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<td>Education Program Development Fund</td>
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<td>Education Sector Strategic Plan</td>
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<td>EU</td>
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<td>FESP</td>
<td>Fiji Education Sector Program</td>
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<td>FMIS</td>
<td>Financial Management Information System</td>
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<td>FTI</td>
<td>Fast Track Initiative</td>
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<td>GBS</td>
<td>General Budget Support</td>
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<td>GEQIP</td>
<td>General Education Quality Improvement Programme</td>
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<td>GER</td>
<td>Gross Enrolment Ratio</td>
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<td>GOI</td>
<td>Government of India</td>
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<td>GPE</td>
<td>Global Partnership for Education</td>
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<td>GSAT</td>
<td>General Scholastic Achievement Test</td>
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<td>GTZ</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit</td>
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<td>H&amp;A</td>
<td>Harmonisation and Alignment</td>
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<td>HLM</td>
<td>Hierarchical Linear Modeling</td>
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<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and Communication Technology</td>
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<td>IDA</td>
<td>International Development Association</td>
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<td>IEG</td>
<td>Independent Evaluation Group</td>
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<td>International Institute for Education Planning</td>
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<td>INSET</td>
<td>In-service Education Training</td>
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<td>JESS</td>
<td>Joint Education Sector Support</td>
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<td>LAC</td>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
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<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
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<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>Ministry of Education</td>
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<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>NBEDS</td>
<td>National Basic Education Development Strategy</td>
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<td>National Council of Educational Research and Training</td>
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<td>NER</td>
<td>Net Enrolment Ratio</td>
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<td>NFE</td>
<td>Non-Formal Education</td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
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NHP  New Horizons Programme
ODA  Official Development Assistance
ODI  Overseas Development Institute
OECD  Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OLS  Ordinary Least Squares
PASEC  Programme on the Analysis of Education Systems of the Conference of Ministers of Education of Francophone Africa
PBAs  Programme-Based Approaches
PDDEB  Ten year plan for the development of basic education
PEDPII  Primary Education Development Plan II
PGBS  Partnership General Budget Support
PIRLS  Progress in International Reading Literacy Study
PISA  Programme for International Student Assessment
PIUs  Project Implementation Units
POC  Priority Operating Costs
PRP  Primary Reading Programme
PRSCs  Poverty Reduction Strategy Credits
PRSP  Poverty Reduction Strategy Program
QUEST  Quality Education through Supporting Teaching
QUIPS  Quality Improvement in Primary Schools
RCTs  Randomized Controlled Trials
Renstra  Education Development Plan
ROSP  Reaching Out of School Pupils
RTI  Research Triangle Institute
SACMEQ  Southern and Eastern Africa Consortium on Monitoring Education Quality
SBS  Sector Budget Support
SSA  Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan
SWAps  Sector-Wide Approaches
TA  Technical Assistance
TIMSS  Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study
UPE  Universal Primary Education
WB  World Bank
WDD  Whole District Development
WSD  Whole School Development
ZCAI  Zambian Cognitive Assessment Instrument
In an era of austerity at home, aid donors are increasingly expected to show how their own contributions are having an impact... It is extremely difficult to attribute increases in numbers of children in school, or improvements in learning attainment, to any one donor... The emphasis on identifying results (may) possibly leading to perverse outcomes... As a wealth of experience shows, sustained investment in education can have a catalytic effect on broader development outcomes, including economic growth, improved food security and gender empowerment. Focusing on quick wins is likely to undermine efforts to achieve these kinds of results. It will also mean that the hard-to-reach, who require targeted measures that are likely to be more costly and complicated, will get neglected. (UNESCO 2011a)

1 Introduction

The simplicity of the question, ‘What do we know about what works in foreign aid to education?’ unfortunately, is not matched by the simplicity of a list of effective interventions or the simplicity in the way aid to education is provided. In recent years there have also been many new and different approaches in the provision of aid to education. If that doesn’t make an assessment of the effectiveness of aid to education difficult enough, the challenges are compounded by the fact not only that education serves many purposes, but educational outcomes are influenced more by what goes on outside schools than within them—widening further the complexities involved in assessing the effectiveness of foreign aid to education. It is at least as challenging as assessing attempts to reform and improve our own national education systems, without crossing international boundaries. Nonetheless, decades of work and accrued knowledge and experience have yielded lessons of what works best, even if such lessons reflect detailed approaches involving capacity development, mentoring, new accountabilities as well as specific ‘inputs’.

The basics of support to education comprise what could be termed ‘first order’ educational requirements such as classrooms, teachers and instructional materials. However, educational outcomes are profoundly influenced by a range of critical and less easily measurable factors such as the nature of the curriculum, the effectiveness of teacher training, the appropriateness of learning materials, school location, school and teacher amenities, the mentoring, supervision and leadership of heads and teachers, the status and respect afforded them by the local community and its involvement in the school. Foreign aid to education can both focus on and contribute greatly to some of these building blocks to improved learning, but drawing a direct causal connection between the foreign aid provided and learning achievements involves far more than merely counting the number of pupils enrolled in primary school and assessing progress towards universal enrolment, one of the Millennium Development Goals. But even here critical problems often arise. When countries near the goal of universal primary education, many face huge challenges to include the final five or so per cent, as these are the ‘hardest-to-reach’ often including those with a range of disabilities and those from marginalized groups. Achieving anything near to universal access also remains a huge challenge in many fragile states, no less ensuring that the learning provided within the classroom is of a standard and quality to enable those passing through the schools to lead fulfilling and productive lives.

Against this complex backdrop, most aid agencies take the ‘easy’ route in providing an account to the public at home of the results of their interventions in the education field—by focussing mostly on reporting on the ‘numbers assisted’ rather than educating the public, on whose votes they rely, and deepening public awareness of the
complicated nature of development effectiveness (and only one of its constituents, aid
effectiveness). In some cases, they go even further, claiming in their ‘simple sound-
bites’ achievements for which the evidence is wanting. For instance, the largest multi-
donor funded education programme, the Global Partnership for Education (GPE,
formerly known as the Fast-Track Initiative or FTI) claims that ‘countries receiving
support from the GPE perform better in all basic education indicators than countries
receiving no Partnership support’ implying that ‘their’ foreign aid has ‘worked’.¹ In
contrast, having reviewed the best available evidence, the Preliminary Report of the
Mid-Term Evaluation of the Education for All (EFA) Fast Track Initiative (Cambridge
Education, Mokoro Ltd. and Oxford Policy Management 2009), was only able to
conclude that there is ‘no robust evidence that FTI-endorsed countries have
systematically outperformed un-endorsed ones’.²

The purpose of this paper is to review what has been learned over many decades of
foreign aid to education. It will discuss what works and what doesn’t and in this
discussion will draw attention to the fact that even a simple assessment requires more
than providing a uniform check-list of ‘inputs’. It will go on to provide some guidance
as to how aid effectiveness can be improved to reach more sustainable, education
outcomes. Section 2 focuses on what we know about aid’s impact on education, going
through some of the constituent factors and some of the major studies of aid to
education. It is divided into two parts. The first part discusses what the evidence on aid
impact tells us and the second part (from 2.10) on what are some of the lessons of the
impact of aid to education. Section 3 examines each of the more important ways aid has
been provided—the different ‘aid modalities’ project aid, sector-wide approaches
(SWAs) including programme-based approaches (PBAs) and budget support. Some of
the ways these interventions have changed and been improved over time are also
discussed. Section 3 focuses on some of the most important ‘wider issues’ that are
essential to understanding the overall contribution that aid can make to education and
what factors continue to impede success. This includes what we know about bringing to
scale different aid-supported programmes, and the lessons learned and challenges still
facing aid donors in the critical areas of budgetary support, institutional strengthening,
the political dimensions of aid-giving, the ‘transferability’ of aid-supported educational
programmes, capacity development via technical co-operation, knowledge transfer,
financial support and South-South dialogue. Finally, Section 5 draws together the
different threads of earlier sections to make some concluding overall comments on the
effectiveness of aid to education and what has been learned.

2 What works in foreign aid to education?

Educationists have continually pointed out (with considerable justification) that it is far
easier to show the impact of aid-supported health interventions than education ones:
Improvements in mortality rates are more visible than increased learning! However,

(accessed 3 January 2012). Five indicators were used: (1) total enrolment; (2) primary school
completion rate; (3) gender parity in primary completion; (4) percentage of repeaters; and (5)
percentage of total government expenditure devoted to education.

² The Report continues: ‘These findings are not surprising, given the short data series available, the
likelihood of selection biases, the complexity of underlying processes and the heterogeneity of
countries within each group. The only safe conclusion is that the mid-term evaluation cannot rely on
global comparisons of this sort, and will need to base its findings on careful country case studies’.  
2
when attempting to assess the contribution of aid to service-delivery, aid to the health sector faces quite similar challenges as does aid to education. This is because attribution is typically multifaceted: providing textbooks and speeding up textbook distribution, like the provision of anti-malarial bednets, will no doubt contribute to overall impact, but determining and especially trying to quantify its specific contribution to broader outcomes is far from easy when set alongside many other contributory factors, only some of which are aid-related. And to identify sustainable improvements is even more difficult as it requires attention to the social, political and economic contexts of the reform as well as the inter-linkages with inputs from other sectors. The world of aid remains littered with visible examples of unsustained projects illustrating the changing fads and fashions of the aid industry. The picture of tractors lying in fields abandoned and rusting for lack of spare parts was a familiar sight in the 1960s and 1970s, replaced by unrepaired and abandoned boreholes across villages in the 1980s and 1990s. Today, we see new computers piled high, unopened and unused in secondary school classrooms in Africa for lack of electricity.

2.1 Aid to education and aid impact studies

From 1995-2010 total aid to education increased in real terms by 360 per cent, from US$2.9bn (in constant 2010 US$) to US$13.3bn in 2010 (see Table 1 and accompanying graph). Over this same period, total aid to basic education increased by 630 per cent, to secondary education, by 294 per cent and to post-secondary education, by 244,268 per cent.3 Whereas the breakdown by sub-sector of aid to education in 1995 comprised 19 per cent for basic, 12 per cent for secondary education and less than 1 per cent to post-secondary education, in 2010, this breakdown was 30 per cent for basic, 10 per cent for secondary education, and with post-secondary education attracting 40 per cent of total aid to education.

Whilst we know that such increased aid monies have helped to contribute to many of the achievements over the past decade, it has been much harder to quantify this impact as is discussed below. Part of the problem has been the focus of impact on school enrolment and attainment rather than on measurements of the quality of education, such as on improved learning. To some extent, this has been rectified by the creation of data sets from international achievement studies such as the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) (http://www.pisa.oecd.org), Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) and Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS) (http://timssandpirls.bc.edu)—though these have been taken up by relatively few developing countries—as well as from regional learning achievement studies such as the Southern and Eastern African Consortium for Monitoring Educational Quality (SACMEQ) (www.sacmeq.org) and the Programme on the Analysis of Education Systems of the Conference of Ministers of Education of Francophone Africa (PASEC) (http://www.confemen.org).4 However, the focus of many development agencies has still been on the contribution of aid toward the

3 These total aid to education figures can be compared with those for total aid to the health sector: for the same period, in real terms, aid to the health sector increased from US$2.4bn to US$9.2bn, an increase of 284 per cent, and for aid to basic health, the increase was 397 per cent, from US$1.4bn to US$7.1bn (OECD/DAC International Aid Statistics, Creditor Reporting System). Also see Table 6. http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=CRS1 (accessed 5 April 2012)

4 ‘Programme d’analyse des systèmes éducatifs de la CONFEMEN’, where CONFEMEN stands for ‘Conférence des ministres de l’éducation des pays ayant le français en partage’. 3
achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, and therefore on increased enrolments, attainment and gender parity. Thus, the Education for All Global Monitoring Report notes the achievements of the education sector worldwide in developing countries as 52 million more children in primary school between 1999 and 2008, reductions in the numbers of children out of school (halved in South and West Asia) and improved gender parity in primary enrolment in regions starting the decade with the greatest gender gaps (UNESCO 2011c).

Aid monies have been channelled into a variety of interventions such as school feeding programmes, classroom construction, teacher education, girls’ scholarships, programmes to reduce student drop-out, curriculum development, targeting different educational levels and utilizing different aid modalities. Individual country project impact evaluations by development agencies have tended to produce more positive results than the studies of aid impact utilizing panel data from international aid and education statistics, as will be discussed below. When focused on the impact of aid to education on outcomes such as access to education or years of completed education, studies have found very small impact. For instance, Michaelowa and Weber (2006) found an increase in the primary completion rate of 2.5 points for an increase in aid to education of 1 per cent of GDP. Their study utilized sectoral aid data drawn from OECD DAC statistics from the early 1970s to 2000 and education statistics drawn from the UNESCO Institute of Statistics data base for 2006 encompassing 120 low and lower-middle-income countries. To put this result into perspective, aid to education in the 1990s across the data set countries was 0.3 per cent of GDP. The authors’ regressions uncovered negative aid impact in countries with extremely oppressive regimes and showed that government expenditure had no greater impact on educational outcomes than aid.

The same authors followed up this work by disaggregating sectoral aid by education level in (Michaelowa and Weber 2007) but found no greater impact than in their earlier work. In this further study, they utilized short term annual data for the period 1999-2004 to investigate whether aid to country-owned strategies, would uncover more significant effects, as well as the longer-term structural panel data for 1990-2004. The same value-added approach was used as in their prior study. Maximum coefficient values of 2.5 per cent for an increase in the aid budget by 1 per cent of GDP were obtained regardless of education level. There was some evidence of decreasing returns to aid for primary and secondary education.

Another panel data study (Dreher et al. 2006) analyses the overall impact of aid over several decades using a production function approach covering 96 low and middle-income countries from 1970-2004, with aid data from 1973 on, and using averages over five year spans. Their results indicate an impact of aid approximately two to three times higher than the estimates of Michaelowa and Weber: on average increasing aid to education by 1 per cent of GDP produces an increase in primary enrolment of 2.5–5 per cent. They do not find that government expenditure on education increases enrolment significantly, nor democracy.

Hanushek’s research on the relationship between educational expenditure and student outcomes goes back many decades, one of his early papers (Hanushek 1981) illustrating the lack of such a relationship, an issue which was subsequently examined by Hedges et al. (1994) in an exchange with Hanushek not limited to different modelling
approaches. Whilst this earlier work was not focused on aid to education, the lack of relationship found between education expenditure and educational outcomes is important in order to understand the inefficiencies that dog the use of educational monies for raising educational achievement. Hanushek and Woessman (2007), looking at the impact of education quality, rather than education expenditure on economic growth, present strong evidence of a relationship between cognitive skills and economic growth. However, this does not take us any closer to the impact of aid—and its use—on educational outcomes, including improving educational quality, in spite of its more relevant focus.

Indeed, identifying the contribution that aid monies make to learning outcomes, in contrast to the focus solely on quantitative expansion of educational systems is a growing feature of the literature on impact and reflects decades of school effectiveness research which has tried to identify the impact on learning outcomes of particular interventions. It is to this research that we now turn.

2.2 School effectiveness research

School effectiveness research was first undertaken within the industrialized world, and hence by donor countries themselves, and subsequently used within developing countries, primarily by industrialized country researchers, focused on production functions that were termed ‘determinants of achievement’, isolating individual inputs and trying to assess which would give the most ‘bang’ for each aid ‘buck’ contributed to an education system. Though the research in aid-recipient countries mirrored that carried out in industrialized countries, surprisingly, the early conventional wisdom from this work made out that developing countries were different from industrialized countries because the school rather than family background factors mattered more in influencing learning achievement differences—reinforcing the view that providing aid to schools was an effective way of using aid resources. However, the veracity (and simplicity) of these early conclusions have been challenged by other work. School effectiveness research continues especially with the increasing attention being paid to the production of more direct measures of educational quality through learning assessments (see Wagner 2011).

2.3 Randomized control trials

In recent years, donors have given less attention to aid inputs and tried to focus more on results and impacts of the aid provided. Interestingly, as increased emphasis has been placed on showing impact and results for aid expenditure, a lot of aid-supported research has reverted to studying specific inputs or pilot projects, through randomized controlled trials (RCTs) that isolate treatment groups and their outcomes from non-recipients, modelled on, for instance, drug trials in which placebos are unsuspectingly given.

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5 See (Hedges et al 1994a, 1994b) and (Hanushek 1994).
6 Indeed, it is ironic that the MDGs focused on the quantitative indicator, primary school completion, as a proxy for the quality of education, i.e. the number of years thought to be sufficient for the retention and sustainability of the capacities acquired.
7 For example (Lockheed and Verspoor 1991).
8 See discussion in (Riddell 1989).
Table 2 provides a summary of the key impact results of some representative examples of such interventions over the past decade. The academic literature is increasing rapidly, as RCTs have emerged as a ‘gold standard’ of impact analysis, though serving a donor’s interest far more than that of a recipient country, which will always have to focus on the education system as a whole, and not merely the individual policy interventions, which like the research, typically, are financed and directed externally.

The work presented in Table 2 encompasses the findings from studies of several different types of interventions. Thus, scholarships (conditional cash transfers) given to poor female students in rural Cambodia have had positive effects on their attendance, though not on their learning (Ferreira et al. 2009). Eighteen months into the programme, recipient children did no better in maths and vocabulary tests than they would have done had they been absent. A more complex scholarship programme devised in Bogota, Colombia impacted positively on attendance rates, pass rates, enrolment, graduation and matriculation (Barrera-Osorio 2008) with the largest impact on children who were paid only if they matriculated high school. The evidence from research into conditional cash transfers in education by the World Bank (Fiszbein and Schady 2009) predominantly underlines the impact of such interventions on enrolment and attendance rather than on learning achievement. Similarly, the impact of deworming treatment in Kenyan schools studied by Kremer and Miguel (2004) is shown in increased school participation rates, but not in relation to greater learning achievement.

Other types of interventions studied through randomized control trials include different approaches to accountability in schools, increasing the information available to parents and local communities on school and student performance; increasing teacher accountability, through performance incentives and monitoring, as well as the employment of non-civil service ‘contract’ teachers; and school-based management. The World Bank reviews much of the available evidence on these interventions in (Bruns et al. 2011). This shows more mixed impact on learning achievement, as opposed to attendance. Learning gains for relatively poor private schools in rural Pakistan are achieved as a result of the information campaign on school and student performance in the Andrabi, Das and Khwaja (2009) study, for example. The Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2011) study of the impact of teacher performance incentives and hiring additional contract teachers in Andhra Pradesh, India also shows impact on learning achievement. In fact the impact of teachers’ bonuses was three times as large as that of the block grants to schools, and the bonus system even improved test scores on tests in other subjects where no teacher incentive was attached. The earlier Duflo and Hanna (2005) teacher incentive study in rural India similarly shows impact on learning achievement. Strengthening school-based committees through grants and a combination of other inputs such as training, democratic election and/or linkage with village committees in rural Indonesia found significant results only for attendance, however, and not for learning achievement (Pradhan et al. 2011).

As can be seen from the results of these different studies, some of the RCTs showed that a positive impact resulted from the particular intervention, and others not. However, it is important to add that when aid monies are financing such research, even when there are positive or promising results, there is no saying whether the intervention will be taken up by policy makers, especially if donor funds are not provided for its upscaling. The crucial issue relates to ‘knowledge transfer’ which is discussed further in section 3.
It is evident that much has been uncovered with respect to the specific effects of individual inputs or approaches in providing aid to education. However, ‘the’ lesson of what works in aid to education has become clearer and it is this: that providing effective aid to education which seeks not merely to increase ‘numbers’—of children in school, textbooks, schools and teachers—but to make a lasting improvement to learning and thus has quality at its core, is both complex and difficult. There is no ‘set’ and established blue-print of what to do that can be applied willy-nilly to all countries. What is needed will be informed not only by the educational system as a whole but by the political economy and sociology of education systems, and by the goals and purpose of formal and non-formal education systems. It will include the obvious basic inputs of teachers, classrooms and instructional materials, but will also need to include or take stock of the status, salary scales and deployment of teachers who, themselves have been educated, the curricula and design and use of examinations, the mentoring, supervision and support of teachers, the policy analysis and targeting of resource allocation to embrace systemic and specific needs, including meeting ethnic, locational and gender requirements, and advancing increased access for those with disabilities with sufficient attention paid to quality improvement so as not to create a second-class system provided for those without alternative choices. This is a far cry from the simple approach of an aid agency building classrooms or providing textbooks alone, and points to the need for agencies to face the far more challenging agenda of helping ministers and ministries of education address better the complexities of issues involved in building improved and sustainable education systems.

Whether through school effectiveness research utilizing production functions or randomized controlled trials of particular interventions, neither approach is capable on its own of an holistic template of education reform. Thus, as aid to education has financed many different interventions, which subsequently, have been studied with such models, perhaps it should not be surprising that such a blue-print hasn’t emerged. As Glewwe and Kremer (2005) found in their review of research into the impact on education outcomes in developing countries, ‘providing additional resources ... may have little impact on learning. More recent evidence from natural experiments and randomized evaluations paints a more mixed, but far from uniformly positive, picture’ (pp. 2-3). Pritchett (1996), in an earlier investigation of the counter-intuitive lack of education’s impact on economic growth in studies which focused on enrolment rate outcomes, hypothesized that increases in the quantity of education could be jeopardized by the quality of education. Hence, we see today, a much greater focus on the cognitive outcomes of education.

2.4 Planning, and judging success

Good planning can shed light on some of the inter-linkages between aid’s specific contribution and its overall impact, foreseeing the consequences of particular aid interventions. This is often in spite of even aid to the education sector as a whole typically being ring-fenced by ministries or NGOs as well as by the sectoral departments of development agencies themselves. Indeed, planning and the surrounding education management information systems (EMIS) feeding such plans have constituted a major area of aid to education: helping countries to create reliable and robust data on issues such as enrolments, transition rates and to plan the expansion of school systems and assess teacher training needs (see Cambridge Education, Mokoro Ltd. and Oxford Policy Management (2010) Appendix IV). Planning’s significant role has been reified,
perhaps, in the multi-donor GPE that was premised on the commitment made by the international community in Dakar\(^9\) that ‘no country with a credible plan would be thwarted from implementing it for a lack of resources’. Nonetheless, without some national data collection yielding the gaps in educational provision—for example, of classrooms, textbooks, teachers or latrines—or the black spots of poor outcomes—whether of access, completion or learning achievement, for instance—it would be hard to determine where to target aid-supported interventions no less independent, national reforms. Indeed, such mapping of needs has extended into research typically funded by aid monies to determine the effectiveness of different inputs to educational reform. Thus, as reported above, for example, girls’ scholarships have been an intervention used in many countries to address gender disparities in school access and completion, based on the accumulated data of EMIS as well as household surveys.

We have seen how ‘impact’, judged of such interventions by RCTs, is able to deal more satisfactorily with the problems of identifying the specific policy’s impact in the sea of other contributory factors. However, how should success (or positive impact) be judged as a result of aid’s intervention? When is a ‘successful’ policy sustained and sustainable? After one year? Two years? Five? Is the fact that girls remain in school and graduate sufficient? Or is it necessary to ask whether the ministry will continue to prioritize such an intervention once donor funds are no longer available?

As well as focusing on the impact of a particular policy intervention such as girls’ scholarships, hiring contract teachers or deworming students, if aid monies are directed at planning and data collection such as with EMIS, how should ‘impact’ be judged for contributing to such basic capabilities necessary for addressing education development and identifying the areas requiring prioritization and the policy interventions to address them? Largely because such basic capabilities are prerequisites of the greater alignment of aid to education with a country’s own objectives, and because donor countries and their agencies have committed themselves to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), ‘success’ has been judged by the production of the ‘plan’ or the ‘EMIS’ or whatever particular output has comprised the objective of the aid monies. Indeed, aid to planning and EMIS has typically been a precursor to most educational investment using the new aid modalities (see below), rather than particular projects.

The success of aid to educational planning, however, needs to be judged not only by the products or outputs produced, such as an educational plan or an annual educational data census, but, also (and far more importantly) by the successful use of such outputs, that is by the contribution they make to furthering better educational outcomes.\(^{10}\) Providing more textbooks and raising primary school completion, for instance, have often been taken as ‘proxies of learning’ and other, qualitative, sustainable outcomes, but there is, of course, no guarantee that they do contribute to better learning. In the case of educational planning, it is the use of such plans and EMIS data for identifying resource needs, targeting allocations and determining appropriate policies which comprise the qualitative outcomes and which illustrate that processes of systemic change are taking place. ‘Successful’ planning is linked to ownership, leadership, capacity development,

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\(^{10}\) See the discussion of aid-funded use of data for planning purposes in (Riddell 1997) covering Namibia, Botswana and Zimbabwe.
public sector reform and the institutional and organizational capacity development that underwrites individual skill acquisition.11

2.5 New aid modalities: overview

More sophisticated approaches were initiated from the mid-1990s to try to address the complexity of education systems. These included budget support, from which funds could be utilized for the education sector, as well as ‘sector-wide approaches’ or SWAs. These new aid modalities emerged from critiques of the weaknesses of providing aid in the form of discrete projects. The problem with projects was not that they didn’t ‘work’, but that they tended to create islands of excellence amidst seas of disadvantage and so did not provide lasting solutions to a country’s educational problems or they isolated individual variables for support. For example, one aid agency might support teacher education, and another textbook production, but if the cracks between such support were not filled systematically, the education systems’ new weave would continue to be threadbare. What was needed was a more systemic approach and it was this which the new aid modalities sought to begin to provide. The Paris Declaration was, in fact, the culmination of much of the work piloted in many parts of the world in aid to the social sectors. The share of project aid, however, remains large in comparison with these other forms of aid, still comprising nearly half (48 per cent) of all ODA to education in 2010 or almost US$6.4bn out of US$13.3bn.12

2.6 SWAs and PBAs

Sector-wide approaches as a means of providing aid to education emerged from the accumulation of evidence of the disappointing lack of sustainability of aid projects in the mid-1990s, with the health and education sectors as the first testing grounds for these new approaches, primarily in Africa. Since that time, SWAs have been widely adopted, both in education and other sectors, and a considerable number of evaluations of 10-15 years’ experience have been carried out to enable judgements to be made about their effectiveness and impact.

The term ‘programme-based approach’ came into being largely so that development agencies who were less keen either on channelling their resources primarily through government, who wanted to include NGOs and CSOs more directly in their programmes, or who were still wedded to projects but who also wanted to be included with the ‘SWA’ donors could ‘feel part’ of these new aid initiatives (UNESCO 2007). Irrespective of the terms used, the idea of both SWAs and PBAs is to align the aid being given more closely to an education sector plan, and the Paris Declaration commitments on aid effectiveness13 provide the broader context for such sector development.

There is a certain irony to the term ‘SWAp’ for two reasons. The first is that so many SWAs have been sub-sectoral rather than sectoral—with a strong focus on the primary sector. The second is that SWAs were created by the donors, not by the recipient

11 See (Bray and Varghese 2011); (Riddell 2009); and (Cambridge Education, Mokoro Ltd. and Oxford Policy Management 2010) Volume 2—Annexes, Annex G: The FTI and Capacity Development.
12 See Table 3 and Section 3 on SWAs and Budget Support.
13 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005).
countries. They were largely superimposed on countries steeped in a history of donor-promoted projects, countries which had struggled to promote the notion of sector-wide planning with donors, typically with the support of UN agencies, such as UNESCO, within the context of reforming their educational systems as a whole (UNESCO 2007).

How important are SWAps and PBAs to education aid? As originally conceived, SWAps were meant both to address the weaknesses of stand-alone project aid and to try to capture the significant potential benefits of donors working more co-operatively in a joint enterprise with recipients aimed both at improving educational outcomes and strengthening recipient capacities. As they began to be set up across a growing number of recipient countries, SWAps encompassed different aid modalities which could include some project aid, provided these projects were consistent with and helped contribute to wider educational goals, and build local capacities. Thus SWAps are best (and more accurately) understood more as an approach, rather than necessarily implying a wholesale move away from projectized funding.

Because the terms ‘SWAp’ and ‘PBA’ both denote ‘approaches’ and are not aid modalities as such, definitional differences obscure precise figures (OECD 2006b). Data from the 2009 EFA Global Monitoring Report suggest SWAps are of growing significance: the share of aid delivered through sector programmes in education increased from 31 per cent in 1999–2000 to 54 per cent in 2005–06. However, if one were to use the categorization of types of aid in the OECD/DAC statistical database, then in 2010 only 5 per cent of total aid to education comprised sector budget support, with an additional 3 per cent in the form of pooled or basket funds (see Table 3). This does not mean, confusingly, that development agencies utilizing project aid are not contributing to SWAps, however.14 Notwithstanding the trend reported in the EFA GMR for an increasing share of aid to education going through SWAps, under the EFA Fast Track Initiative (FTI) (now called the Global Partnership in Education (GPE), which described itself as ‘a new aid paradigm supporting aid effectiveness as a key objective’ and as ‘an excellent model for donor co-ordination and collaboration’, (FTI 2009), from 2002 to the end of 2009, the project modality of providing education aid was used in 28 countries, pooled funds in 6 countries, and sector budget support in only 4 countries.15 And as noted above, GPE contributors are committed to utilizing the most ‘aligned’ aid modality. Yet, in the recent Mid-Term Evaluation of FTI, in only Burkina Faso and Zambia—out of 17 country case studies—did FTI show a strong positive contribution to aid harmonization and alignment with country systems.16

Yet of the 28 FTI-endorsed low-income countries up to 2010, 21 of these had SWAps in place or under preparation (FTI Secretariat). It would seem that some development agencies are engaged in a game of semantics, contributing and engaging with education

14 It is currently difficult to create a time series of ODA by aid type as these classifications are being mapped historically by OECD/DAC Statistics just now (2012).
16 (Cambridge Education, Mokoro Ltd. and Oxford Policy Management 2010); and note: ‘Overall, the apparent lack of consistency across case study countries in the criteria for using different aid modalities has contributed to blurring the image of the FTI as a champion of Paris Declaration objectives in-country’. The cases of Burkina Faso and Zambia’s applications to FTI illustrate the challenge to the World Bank’s adherence to ‘due diligence’ in its management of FTI’s Catalytic Fund.
SWAps but remaining quite risk-averse in terms of using either sector budget support or a pooled fund for its aid monies.

2.7 Budget support

Channelling aid through national budgets has been a feature of aid provision in recent years, either as general or sectoral budget support, in spite of the proportion of aid channelled through these aid modalities still being quite small. As we have seen, sector budget support comprised 5 per cent of aid to education in 2010 and general budget support just 2.6 per cent of all aid to all sectors. Despite the small overall proportion of aid channelled through budget support, in some countries, however, it has comprised as much as 20-30 per cent of their official aid. This was the case, for instance, in the early 2000s in Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda and Burkina Faso (Advisory Board for Irish Aid 2008). Both forms of budget support have relevance to the discussion of aid to education. Indeed, an understanding of the considerable experience with budget support—both general and education sector-specific—will add to our discussion of what works in aid to education, especially as experiences with SWAps across different countries have embraced a variety of aid modalities.

2.8 Institutional reform of education and political economic insights

The new aid modalities provide a more holistic perspective on the role of aid to education, prioritizing the aid recipient’s objectives in their education plans. Having to balance policy options for a whole education system takes one along a different path from determinants of achievement research, and also from RCTs which focus on individual interventions. They comprise a more complicated interface of aid impacting educational systems rather than merely individual, identifiable outcomes. This raises the issue of institutional reform, together with all the interlinkages between different institutions rather than any individual education policy per se. Thus, for instance, public sector reform might have a greater impact on classroom teaching than any particular teaching intervention. The positive impact of teachers’ bonuses in the research reviewed above, illustrates the importance of incentives, but it is questionable whether such a policy could be brought to scale outside of wider institutional reform, for instance. As Hanushek and Woessman write, ‘For educational investments to translate into student learning, all the people involved in the education process have to face the right incentives that make them act in ways that advance student performance’ (Hanushek and Woessman 2007: 79).

Those who have studied the political economy of educational reform such as Grindle, raise other important, related issues of relevance to those policies that are enacted. For instance, she writes, ‘In practice, whatever the ideas behind social policy interventions, there tends to be a political bias in favour of more services rather than higher quality ones’ (Grindle 2010: 21). Political trade-offs often fly in the face of evidence of impact of discrete interventions. The prominence of investment in building schools or enabling increasing access to them biases politicians toward such investments: they are better vote-catchers than improving the quality of education which is both much more difficult to achieve and less rapidly observable.

Relatedly, Grindle’s analysis also shows that with the failure to impact educational quality, one result of continuing investment in quantitative improvement is that the
middle-class exit the public system, leaving the poorer families who are harder to organize and to give voice to their concerns about the quality of education their children are receiving.

Likewise, Booth’s work points to the need not only to identify the ‘right’ institutional reforms, just like the policy interventions with the greatest impact, but those that are feasible, where there is room to manoeuvre (Booth 2011), echoing Grindle’s alert to so-called ‘best practices’ and development fads which even if tested, will still be constrained by domestic political processes affecting policy outcomes. (Grindle 2010) How many policies are enacted on the basis of a donor’s pilot impact evaluation when the necessary monies are provided by the donor? How many continue after the funds are no longer provided? This is why a longer-term as well as more complex understanding of judging success is so important.

2.9 Long-term and short-term impact: different approaches

Field experiments can test individual policy interventions in situ and therefore, are contextualized for the country—or at least the locality—where they are being tested. The impact results can contribute to the evidence base for a palette of reforms at any one particular time, but unless followed up, there is no knowing whether their impact will be successfully scaled up and be sustainable.

A recent analysis by the EU’s auditors is quite candid about the difficulty of attributing changes in outcome indicators to any particular project or programme, pointing to three reasons for this (European Court of Auditors 2011). First of all, there is the time lag involved—to develop and implement the programme, and in order to see results, to complete the programme as well as to integrate it with other support elements. For instance, a programme of curriculum development will need to be followed by textbook and learning material development, teacher training, and only after implementation in the classroom will any impact on students’ learning be possible to investigate.

Second, it will be necessary to disentangle the impact of the programme in question from other, related factors. The facility of RCTs in isolating the influence of the programme in question from other variables, given experimental conditions, is what has made the methodology so attractive to researchers. It has the cachet for economists that multilevel analysis has had for educationists faced with the non-random variances on student outcomes previously explained away in ordinary-least-squares (OLS) equations. Such variances have provided the meat of much educational research investigating the impact of different policy interventions, making possible the study of groups of students within their classes with their particular teachers and methods and resources, in particular schools and areas—all of which contribute to student outcomes. (Yu 2007; Michaelowa 2001; Michaelowa and Wechtler 2006)

The third difficulty of attribution is that even in highly aid-dependent countries in which aid comprises a large proportion of educational investment, the identification of the particular contribution of any one programme or fund will be confounded by others’. So if the time lag necessary to study impact has not defeated the investigation of causality, then the other factors will.
An alternative to such impact analyses, given the difficulties of attribution, has been to study long-term trends in outcomes, such as enrolment, drop out, repetition, learning achievement—if the data have been available—and many quality proxies such as primary completion rate, pupil-teacher ratio, pupils per textbook, percentage trained teachers, etc. However, as has been discussed above, no significant relationship between expenditure—and this can be domestic or external—and qualitative student outcomes—has been uncovered. The resurgence of donor investment in learning achievement assessments, one could view perhaps as a swan song to aid this type of long-term impact assessment. Yet, one could also see it as a replication of what has already been attempted, unsuccessfully—in terms of identifying impact—in industrialized countries for many years.

Since 2002, the EFA Global Monitoring Report has reviewed the progress made toward Education for All. The most recent Report (UNESCO 2011b) asks: ‘Does increased financing make a difference to the rate of progress towards the Education for All goals?’ The authors acknowledge that it is difficult to answer the question and that the evidence is mixed, association not being the same as causation. Appendix 1, ‘Aid, Policies and Progress toward EFA in 13 Countries’, illustrates some of the educational outcomes achieved in countries receiving significant aid funds over recent periods in order to provide some evidence, at least, of such association.

2.10 Lessons of aid’s impact on education

We now shift focus from what the evidence on impact tells us to some of the lessons of aid’s impact on education. Glewwe and Kremer comment on the importance of contextualizing interventions within wider ‘processes’: ‘Rather than an engineering process of replicating ‘best practices’ and assuming costs, development is about evolution, growth, and continuous improvement. The most significant contribution of development programmes may be in initiating and stimulating change, rather than starting project activities that cannot be continued without on-going subsidies’. They continue, ‘most education policy change has little direct or immediate impact on school quality, and some has unanticipated—and sometimes negative—outcomes as other parts of the system adapt to the new policy (Glewwe and Kremer 2005).

This point is developed further by Pritchett—himself an economist of education—who writes, provocatively, of the ‘irrelevance of the economics of education’. He argues—in the context of developing countries dependent on development assistance—that economists typically bolster the role of the state vis-à-vis parents and communities in three ways: first, by legitimizing schooling as a public good (rather than its also being a private good in which families have a stake); second, by engaging in research for policy makers who do not subsequently disseminate the results of such research; and third, by perpetuating ‘false notions’ about how innovations will be brought to scale. (Pritchett 2008). With such insulation from involvement in decision making and the contributions made by aid to the evidence base for policy, public pressures for improvements to the quality of education remain muted. Some of the accountability reforms analysed by RCTs provide examples of recent attempts to engage the public in education movements to improve the quality of education. But if these, too, remain as single intervention additions to the panoply of factors contributing to education outcomes, they, too, are tarred with the criticisms directed at ring-fenced projects.
The developing world is replete with examples of unsustainable—and unsustained—innovative projects together with the research and evaluations which illustrate their effectiveness, but which subsequently, are not brought to scale. Table 4 provides some examples of such projects and their evaluation results where learning achievement has been measured and is discussed below. The remainder of this section reviews some of the lessons that have been drawn from some of the development agencies’ syntheses of their aid to education. In searching for the impact of aid to education on education outcomes, especially of educational quality, as opposed merely to access and quantitative enrolment increases, we have used several sources, none of which has been decisive in describing ‘what works’ sustainably: the long-term quantitative panel data, the school effectiveness research, the RCTs in education and the multitude of project or programme evaluations.

The European Commission (EC) has analysed, reflected on and consolidated the lessons from its experience of support to education in developing countries in a recent publication (European Commission 2010). One of the first lessons outlined is the importance of working on a whole sector approach which not only includes the continuum from early childhood education through to lifelong learning, but which also reinforces the linkages between education and the world of work. Related to this lesson is a second one which underlines the linkages between education and other sectors that impact access, quality and inclusion in education. For instance the linkages between education access and addressing the needs of children with physical disabilities or who are suffering from malnutrition or debilitating diseases, need to be included in any education sector plan: it is not sufficient simply to adhere solely to ‘educational’ inputs. Similarly, the fundamental intersectoral linkage between teachers’ compensation and public sector reform is another important example of looking beyond the education sector for solutions or alternative approaches. The decentralization of education management has been implemented in many countries with the support of aid monies. However, as education administrations are decentralized, they should not suffer the fate of being poorly resourced and so unviable. It used to be the case that development agencies would not allocate funding for teachers’ or administrators’ salaries, seeing such recurrent expenditure as a national responsibility. This has changed with the introduction of sector-wide support. These are all examples of intersectoral linkages which need to be considered from the start, and not as afterthoughts.

The EC also has underlined the importance of some of its aid effectiveness practices as ‘lessons’ from its experience in giving aid to education. Such practices include the division of labour amongst development agencies engaged in the sector, so as not to crowd in work on the same sub-sector or issue. Also included is complementarity, to ensure appropriate and sufficient coverage of different educational areas, for instance, to avoid all the Member States funding teacher education. The coherence of EU policy is also highlighted, ensuring, for instance, that what one is giving with one hand in support to the education sector, is not being negated by another, such as with trade tariff restrictions or attracting skilled nationals away from their countries.

The EC’s review of the evidence (European Commission 2010) also shows that countries with more balanced investments across the different educational sub-sectors are those which have grown fastest. Yet, in spite of the consensus on the need for such a comprehensive and balanced approach, uneven development has characterized the education trajectories of so many countries, a contribution to which have been the
different preferences of development agencies for particular education sub-sectors over the past decades. Table 1 illustrates this well. Whereas in 1995 less than 1 per cent of aid to education went to post-secondary education, in 2010 it comprised 40 per cent of all aid. Whilst aid to basic education has grown from 19 per cent in 1995 to 33 per cent in 2005, in 2010, its share diminished to 30 per cent of total aid. The share of aid going to secondary education, meanwhile, has been quite steady over this period, ranging from 12 per cent in 1995 to 10 per cent in 2010. Yet it is this sub-sector which is meant to feed post-secondary education, especially in countries in which universal primary education has been or has nearly been attained.

When international representatives met in Dakar, Senegal in 2000 and committed their countries and development agencies to Education for All, the Dakar EFA commitment did not focus only on primary education, nor on access, but included education quality, which belatedly has returned as a key agenda item for aid to education (World Education Forum 2000). These commitments went considerably beyond those made ten years previously in Jomtien, Thailand, that every person’s basic learning needs should be met (World Declaration on Education for All and Framework for Action to Meet Basic Learning Needs 1990). This was in part because of the focus of MDG 2 on primary school completion, which, in itself, was an attempt to go beyond merely enrolment statistics to a minimum of five years primary school completion, as a proxy indicator of learning. The Dakar commitments included goals related to comprehensive early childhood care and education as well as the learning needs of all young people and adults, adult literacy, achieving gender equality in education and improving all aspects of the quality of education. The commitments focused on ensuring that by 2015 all children, particularly girls, children in difficult circumstances and those belonging to ethnic minorities, would have access to and complete, free and compulsory primary education of good quality. In contrast, MDG 2 is to ensure that all children will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling (United Nations 2000). The new aid modalities had the potential to go beyond primary education and to focus on the whole education system, but in practice, even sector-wide approaches (sic) have mainly concentrated on basic education.

If one looks at what is emphasized in the publicity surrounding MDG 2 after ten years, the positive achievements noted are the surges in enrolments following the abolition of primary school tuition fees in many countries (viz. Burundi, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Malawi, Nepal, and Tanzania), the additional classrooms, teaching materials and teachers hired, and the focus on attracting and retaining in school girls, ethnic minorities, and the hard to reach (UN 2010). No mention is made of learning, in spite of the investments made and aid channelled into important building blocks for increasing enrolments, numbers of teachers, infrastructure, promoting girls’ education and expanding access. MDG 2 would seem to have trumped the more comprehensive, quality-focused EFA commitments.

Table 4 presents the evaluation findings of a selection of USAID project or programme evaluations carried out over the past two decades which investigated the impact of USAID interventions on learning achievement. The Chapman and Quijada (2009) review of USAID education project evaluations notes the prevalence of student learning achievement as the most important indicator of education quality—in 28 of the 33 projects reviewed—though with only 9 evaluations methodologically able to draw valid conclusions, i.e. with comparison groups. Of these, in only 5 interventions are
significant learning gains recorded. Table 4 covers two comprehensive intervention programmes—in Malawi (Hebert, Randolph, and Udedi 2002) and Jamaica (Chesterfield et al. 2002)—the introduction of continuous assessment in Swazi schools (Clark and Pearson 1996), teachers’ professional development in Ghana (The QUIPS Program Evaluation Team 2005) as well as a set of Latin American and Caribbean countries (Aguirre Division 2006), and a school health and nutrition programme in Zambia (Freund et al. 2005). Mixed results are reported for the impact on learning achievement, across the different evaluations, with the Ghanaian and Zambian project evaluations—which utilized more rigorous methodologies—able to record significant learning achievement gains for the students benefiting from the programmes. Like Kenny (2010), who draws out the comparison between ‘schooling’ and ‘learning’, in spite of the investments made with aid monies, there are often relatively small learning gains, even in those projects recording positive impact, as can be seen from Table 4.

USAID commissioned an in-depth evaluation of its support to education (Gillies 2010) over two decades which covered the following topics and considered the implications for national education policy of supporting EFA goals and more effective support from donor agencies:

- abolition of school fees,
- decentralization,
- cost effectiveness of complementary education systems for hard-to-reach populations,
- school effectiveness with an emphasis on efficient use of instructional time,
- indicators and information systems,
- secondary school teacher shortages, and
- donor effectiveness.

A key finding is the lack of sustainability of the interventions assessed, in spite of the success of most projects, ‘education systems neither improve nor sustain reforms’ (Gillies 2010: viii). Indeed, in all the evaluation findings summarized in Table 4, not one is seen to be sustainable without increased funds allocated to the different project costs involved, whether for training, printing, salaries, deworming drugs or learning materials once the ‘project’ has been completed.

The (Gillies 2010) study points to other factors beyond financial sustainability as being crucial for sustainable change. The integration of any intervention within the context of the long-term goals for the education system is a first priority—whether the interventions involve decentralization, service delivery, policy dialogue, information and analysis, teacher training, workshops, textbooks or testing. It is the context of the programmes that must be understood. This implies that best practices cannot merely be transferred from one country to another.

Second, the authors point to ownership of the programme or intervention—not merely at the top—but throughout the system—involving each level of stakeholder from national through regional down to school level administrators and including teachers and parents. Development agencies often elicit approval at the top and then implement

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17 This evaluation draws on (Chapman and Quijada 2009).
the programme, or the pace of implementation is too great to ensure such thorough involvement leading to ownership.

Third, the authors point to the necessity of having ‘feedback loops’ that can sustain change and bring interventions to scale. Such ‘loops’ can involve public information, gaining political support, devising incentives, etc. (Gillies 2010). Such feedback loops are fundamental to sustainable, systemic change and continuous improvement, requiring the alignment between institutional leadership and stakeholder ownership. Without such stakeholder involvement and ownership, surviving frequent changes in political leadership will be difficult. This is true, of course, for any education system.

These findings dovetail and are wholly consistent with those of Grindle (2010) referred to above. The strong implication is clear: for aid to education to have a sustainable impact on educational systems, approaches are needed which focus beyond the short-term and beyond particular or specific interventions. If aid is to have a lasting effect, it needs to be provided longer term time-frame, and with much greater attention paid to the educational system as a whole, including the institutions, organizational practices and incentives, with sufficient understanding of the political, economic and social context which underpins it and with which it has a critically important interface. In short, if aid to education is to ‘work’, what is needed is something quite different from the typical ‘aid project’, a type of intervention which does not lend itself easily to short term impact assessments. Thus, even if project evaluations are positive (and this includes methodologically rigorous ones), when viewed from the perspective of long-term sustainability, their wider impact will remain in doubt.

Confirming the wider applicability of the results of this survey of the USAID evidence, a study of the relationships between learning scores and other measures of school quantity and quality (Education Policy and Data Center 2008), utilizing learning assessment and examination data for 25 developing countries, found no strong nor consistent relationship between learning scores and ‘entry rate, primary net attendance rate, survival rate’, nor ‘the pupil teacher ratio’. Thus, the evidence suggests that many of the so-called achievements or successes of aid to education would seem to have a pyrrhic quality.

3 The evidence on aid modalities

3.1 Aid modalities

What has been achieved by the different aid modalities donors have applied to different recipient countries? The experiences of 13 countries, among them those receiving amongst the most education aid from different donors, are brought together and summarized in Appendix 1. The information provided illustrates the different achievements and challenges of quite a diverse group of countries. Confirming the thrust of the earlier discussion, on the one hand, the summary data reveals successes of individual projects together with considerable experience with SWAPs and an increase in enrolments; yet, on the other hand, it draws attention to the challenges of contributing to providing a quality education for all which can assist recipient countries’ development: ‘the’ issue which remains high on everyone’s development agendas. The experiences of this set of countries is representative of the challenges of high repetition

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and drop-out rates as well as attracting the most disadvantaged to schools: that is, going beyond MDG 2 to embrace the EFA commitments made in 2000 in Dakar.

3.2 Project aid

The fact that project aid continues to be given in significant amounts is striking. In 2010 nearly half of the total aid to education committed to developing countries was in projectized form (see Table 3). This is in spite of repeated critiques and the cumulative experience of the advantages of the new aid modalities. Project aid is given either with lip service paid to the international commitments on aid effectiveness or with rationalizations as to why project aid is the appropriate approach. Some projects, of course, can serve important purposes, especially in piloting new approaches. However, the clear implication of the reviews and assessments of their impact is that their success can never make more than a partial and limited contribution to sustainable educational progress, given the complexity of reforming education systems and the need for all the different and diverse stakeholders in education (and not only the aid donors) to work together to achieve lasting change. This is ‘the’ lesson from the above review of the evidence of aid’s impact, echoing the thrust behind the commitment to alignment with country systems in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. Indeed, development partners in the multi-donor Global Partnership for Education are committed to using the most aligned modality, and if not, then having to provide a full justification or explanation (EFA-FTI 2007), the GPE clearly delineating the spectrum of aid modalities from the least to the most aligned as being: project support, pooled fund support, sector budget support (EFA-FTI 2008).

Rigorous analysis of different aid modalities is made more difficult by donors adopting the ‘new’ rhetoric of co-operation and arguing that they are providing their aid to education as part of sector-wide approaches while continuing to provide aid in project form, but in a manner little different from traditional practices. This continues to occur. For instance, the commitment to reducing the number of stand-alone Project Implementation Units (PIUs) within which discrete donor-funded projects were run, has often resulted in their reinvention, as Ministry-embedded, equivalent PIUs, within which local staff are paid supplementary salaries to ensure the work of the Unit is prioritized, where such staff are answerable to technical assistants (TA) or even their line managers, who, themselves, have been designated as Project Directors.\(^\text{18}\) These changes ensure that these Units are not ‘counted’ as stand-alone PIUs, but in practice they function almost the same as they have always done.

3.3 The importance of context

The evidence summarized in the previous section made clear that any successful intervention requires considerable contextualization—if not of the theory and placement of the intervention within the educational reform, then certainly in terms of ownership and direction by nationals, as opposed to donors or their specially hired technical assistance (TA). If there is no national buy-in of the project intervention, then the

\(^{18}\) There are many examples of this, including those in which the recipient governments legislate for ministry staff working on such donor projects to receive ‘priority operating costs’ (POC) (supplements) in relation to such work, such as in Cambodia, where the ‘POC’ is only due such staff in the GPE (WB-administered) and ADB project offices—in the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport (Royal Government of Cambodia 2010).
sustainability, if not the ‘success’ in the short-term, will be questionable. Good examples of successful projects, therefore, are typically those taken up by the educational or political leadership.

In a recent review of research into ‘Factors Influencing Educational Quality and Effectiveness in Developing Countries’ commissioned by GTZ, the German aid agency, four sets of key variables emerged that would require possible investigation and contextualization in any aid to education (Riddell 2008). They are categorized as follows, into: (1) supporting inputs; (2) enabling conditions; (3) school climate; and (4) the teaching/learning process. With the exception of ability grouping and repetition, which were found to be negative influences on educational quality, when analysed in the studies reviewed, all the rest were found to have positive influences on educational quality. There are no surprises in the lists. Amongst the supporting inputs are the following: textbooks and instructional materials, class size, distance (to school), classroom/school amenities, pre-school education, children’s health and nutrition, parental and community involvement in the school, teacher supervision and development, and standards or institutional guidelines.

Suggesting that these variables be considered in designing any educational intervention—due to the positive findings for these variables in many studies—is not the same as implying that a ‘determinants of achievement’ approach is necessary to decide which factors are suitable for investment. Rather, they are best seen more as a starting point for dialogue, once one has surveyed the information available on each of them, engaging not only policy makers, but wide stakeholder groups. Similarly, there needs to be a balance among the different variables, given their interaction, or their contribution to improving school quality may be jeopardized (Mingat 2005).

Under ‘enabling conditions’ are listed, of course, teachers and principals as well as ‘time’, which typically includes annual teaching hours, student absenteeism, etc. With respect to teachers, some of the variables requiring local investigation include: subject knowledge, verbal ability, language, pre-service and in-service education, pedagogical repertoire, experience, proximity and gender; and for principals, their leadership, supervision skills and training.

School climate raises important issues about the local community, its relationship to the school and its professional staff, similarly, teachers’ commitment, incentives and status. In addition are such variables as order and discipline, the goals for the improvement of the school, the curriculum, and school standards and expectations.

Finally, the category ‘teaching/learning process’ includes many of the variables on which so many education interventions are based, namely: time on task, pedagogy, mother tongue, reading, homework, assessment and feedback, and multi-grade classroom approaches.

If one looks at evaluations of individual projects, many of the concerns surrounding the need for a holistic, comprehensive and contextualized approach are examined. For instance, the recent AusAID completion report of the Australia Indonesia Basic Education Program (AIBEP) (Australia Indonesia Basic Education Program (AIBEP) 2010) refers to the interdependence of the different components of the programme, the teacher training, the training of principals, district supervisors and co-ordinators, the
capacity development in whole school and whole district development, financial management, planning and monitoring from the central level down to the school level; and the evaluation warns against too great an influence of AusAID in the overall design, which would inhibit the integration of these components into a coherent programme.

A different point—on sustainability—is raised in the recent evaluation of the AusAID Fiji Education Sector Program (FESP) (Pennington etc. 2010) but one which could equally apply to many programmes, not least sector wide approaches which are meant to rely on a greater degree of national ownership and direction and typically involve considerable capacity development. The evaluation points out that the handover of activities underestimated the technical capacity and/or available resources needed for maintaining the programme as well as the high degree of staff turnover at the senior levels.

This evaluation also highlighted the importance of measuring educational outcomes, rather than concentrating primarily on the detailed monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of each activity. This would have improved the programme’s ability to measure its own performance, contributions and impact. (Pennington et al. 2010) The devotion of M&E funds specifically for project activities, rather than for this wider, national purpose, is a weakness of wider applicability and is often the case in ministries of education whose M&E budgets are under-resourced.

Thus, even projects undertaken for trialling new approaches also require some advance thinking with respect to how they are carried out, whether it is more than with the blessings of the senior administrators or policy makers and whether they carve out some ownership in the process, whether they fit within a sector plan, fill a gap, and are coordinated by the ministry, with respect to others’ contributions; whether they enable on-the-job capacity development and do not entail merely flown in experts who manage the project’s implementation, leave, study its impact and then return to report back on its impact to senior people.

These comments and their applicability also resonate with the assessments made of the application of much educational research carried out with aid monies. At times, such research and its findings remain unused within the recipient country because of deaf ears down the line of those who have no stake in new policy implementation. One reason for this is that policy implementation drawing on the research findings, besides making more use of the development agency’s resources, may require the introduction of systemic changes to the way things are done which have not been part of the policy makers’ mindsets. They might be happy for the project to take place, especially if it is financed and managed by external ‘experts’, but when it comes to scaling-up, there is often limited ‘buy-in’. For example, there is no evidence of any country in which contract teachers have superseded civil service teachers’ employment. And if there were, there is no saying that the impact would be comparable to that measured in a pilot such as the (Muralidharan and Sundararaman 2011) study. Such impact analyses study a particular period of time, and who is to know—without the benefit of hindsight—whether upscaling is achieved. ‘Successful’ projects, for instance, such as conditional cash transfers or school nutritional or health programmes, no less the introduction of enhanced school census data collection, fail to be implemented successfully to scale either because of lack of funds or sufficient involvement and incentivization of all the stakeholders. Projects need not only to be technically clear, but also to avoid being
politically blind. None of the USAID projects reviewed in Section 2 was unquestionably sustainable, either financially—because of insufficient national budgets to take over from USAID funding—or because of insufficient ‘buy-in’ by those with political power throughout the system (Chapman and Quijada 2009: 276).

A major 2006 Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) evaluation of primary education projects supported by the World Bank (Nielsen et al. 2006) pinpoints some of these concerns and is discussed below. However, one must bear in mind the processes of learning from such lessons, and whether the mentoring necessary to ensure systemic uptake—both in the development agencies and in the ministries—is in place, for the incentives of donor professionals—as well as their contractors—need to be considered as much as the incentives of those with whom they are working in-country.

One of the factors uncovered as responsible for weak learning outcomes in the World Bank evaluation related to the failure to ensure adequate reading skills were developed in the early primary years. Examples are given from three country projects, in Mali, Honduras and Peru (World Bank 2000). Relatedly, the evaluation points out the lack of baseline data such as participation rates, delivery of services and quality inputs, especially learning outcomes, disaggregated by gender and by socioeconomic status. The lack of such data has often prevented good programme design, and the inability to judge impact. Insufficient experimentation with local solutions to raise learning outcomes is a further lesson pointed out in the evaluation, and the lack of attention to teacher recruitment policies and performance incentives.

What is encouraging is that some of the lessons from the IEG evaluation (Nielsen et al. 2006) have been fed into the World Bank’s current approach. Early grade reading, measuring learning outcomes, and focusing on teachers’ incentives, for instance, have all featured in more recent World Bank projects, together with a focus on the most disadvantaged. A precursor to the World Bank’s (and USAID’s) support for reading was the Primary Reading Programme (PRP) that was carried out in Zambia. This began in the mid-1990s and having been piloted successfully, was then taken up in the Zambian SWAp, the Basic Education Sub-Sector Investment Programme (BESSIP). However success does not seem to have been sustained. In spite of the foreseen integration and upscaling of the PRP into the Ministry’s curriculum and teacher education, a recent evaluation of the PRP did not find evidence of the same, distinct success of the PRP over non-PRP approaches in learning outcomes (IOB Impact Evaluation 2008). One wonders whether the uptake of the Early Grade Reading Assessment (EGRA) and its approach to teaching reading (Research Triangle Institute (RTI) International 2009) will meet with the same initial but unsustained success.

Other lessons also emerge from the IEG study (Nielsen et al. 2006). The evaluation recognizes that the most successful objective of the Bank’s programmes was increased access or expanded enrolments. However the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) recognizes that some of these achievements—primarily based on supply-side inputs such as classrooms and textbooks—contributed less than they should have done to education outcomes without the supportive investments also seen to be necessary. For instance, the arrival of textbooks at a school was often seen as a successful meeting of the project’s objectives, rather than the beginning of the necessary mentoring through teacher supervision in how best to make use of the textbooks. Other ‘big bang’ contributions to enrolment expansion, such as fee abolition, automatic promotion, the
provision of contract teachers or double-shifting, it was recognized, had negative effects both on learning outcomes and the sustainability of the interventions. If a child is merely promoted from one grade to the next without improved learning, the efficiency of the education system may increase in terms of student years taken for primary school completion, but the ultimate objectives of the investment, clearly, are greatly diminished. The evaluation recognizes that weak management incentives for quality rather than quantity improvements need to be addressed, though it is unclear what further ‘determinants of achievement’ studies based on learning assessments will contribute to this conundrum, which is a political, rather than a technical issue at best.

What the evidence suggests is that while it is important to recognize the ‘successes’ of projects, it is also necessary to be vigilant with respect to the prerequisites of their sustainability, especially when brought to scale. The evidence also suggests the greater difficulty in achieving sustainable learning outcomes. The success of efforts to improve student learning across World Bank projects covered in (Nielsen et al. 2006) and across USAID projects of the same period is ‘around 2 to 6 per cent, depending on context, subject matter, and grade level’ (Chapman and Quijada 2008).

3.4 SWAps

Education SWAp experience has been reviewed in a recent study by a long-standing British educational consultancy firm, CfBT (Boak and Ndaruhiutse 2011). Their study is based on an analysis of the global as well as the grey literature, covering education SWAs in diverse countries. An evaluation carried out for the French development agency, L’Agence Française de Développement (AFD) (Cafferini and Pierrel 2009) examined in detail the SWAp experiences in Burkina Faso, Mauritania and Niger. The main conclusions of these two studies provide a mixed picture and one far less positive than is commonly conveyed in donor literature. Thus whilst SWAps are in theory still heralded as better than project aid and as the evidence illustrates, a number of practical benefits have resulted, there have also been problems, some serious. For instance, many donors have not changed their earlier practices in giving aid, while institutional management constraints and capacity development and political hurdles have held back the potential of SWAps to make a greater difference to education in aid-recipient countries. Few evaluators who have assessed the impact of SWAps would challenge the view that the gap between what SWAps have done and what they could do, remains both large and still far too wide (Cambridge Education, Mokoro Ltd. and Oxford Policy Management 2010; Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2003).

The (Boak and Ndaruhiutse 2011) analysis of the impact of SWAps in education drew many conclusions from the experiences of different countries engaged in such an approach, similar to the findings of the earlier AFD study (Cafferini and Pierrel 2009). SWAps brought with them many expectations of changed donor-recipient behaviour, not all of which have been met. For instance, the harmonization and alignment gains from SWAps have not always materialized, and there has been more limited progress on meaningful engagement between national governments and civil society (Institute for Health Sector Development 2003). As we have seen, the bulk of aid to education remains in project form, challenging harmonization and alignment meaningfully. ‘Light’ alignment in a SWAp has often meant little more than ensuring that the project objectives matched ‘an’ objective in the education sector development plan. And civil
society engagement has often meant little more than having a single representative on the otherwise donor agency—government education group.

Boak and Ndaruhutse’s study points to a further, important, expected dividend from a SWAp: more appropriate and relevant prioritization of sector objectives and programmes (rather than the sum total of what donor agencies bring to the table). But as they point out, this requires national leadership as well as public policy assessments, which Cafferini and Pierrel refer to as often ‘embryonic’ and generally inadequate. Neither have transactions costs been reduced—as expected—with SWAp engagement, but rather, the reverse.

Boak and Ndaruhutse’s analysis, however, underlines certain achievements that have emerged from education SWAps: improved inter-governmental relationships as well as partnerships between national governments and donors; and improved planning capacity and broad institutional development. Providing aid ‘on-budget’ has enabled broad state-citizen accountability, especially when policy trade-offs and their underlying resource needs are made transparent. Whereas donors in the past were shy to support recurrent costs, SWAps have often encompassed these, and coupled with support for capacity building, this has added value. SWAps have also contributed to what have become common practices across many countries: fee-free basic education service delivery, and in some cases, post-basic education. The enrolment gains seen in many countries due to the abolition of school fees have been supported through SWAps. In addition, SWAps have influenced targeting of the disadvantaged in gaining access to education in many countries through policies which have emerged from policy dialogue between donors and government, for instance (UNICEF 2006).

Stepping back from these more detailed effects, more generally what has emerged from these two studies is the highlighting of a number of problems in relation to practices by donors and recipients in SWAps: they have identified areas where more work is needed in order to make SWAps more successful than they have been to date. The Boak and Ndaruhutse study points not only to the need for greater ownership and leadership by recipient countries, but from the donors’ perspective, the need to analyse the political economy of each country before implementing a SWAp, to understand and incorporate formal and informal incentives into the design of a SWAp. Both studies illustrate how donor practices often undermine such ownership. For instance, when the data provided in sector reviews is inadequate for the donors’ purpose, often due to weak EMIS, donors often launch their own, additional review missions. Similarly, the underdeveloped links between SWAps and civil service reforms, public financial management and sector management reviews—all of which may well be supported by the same donor groups—often results in poor national integration of such fundamental policies (Brown et al. 2001). The AFD study points to weaknesses in relation to capacity development. It is argued that donor capacity development initiatives are often little more than mass training and the provision of equipment, provided too late and poorly co-ordinated, diminishing the potential returns, especially to institutional development. There are other donor practices referred to which diminish the step-change SWAps were intended to make to aid effectiveness and thereby development effectiveness. For instance, general budget support and sector support programmes are often poorly co-ordinated; there is often excessive planning and funding targets taking precedence over policy dialogue and strategic decision making; the sub-sector focus of so many education SWAps has made the integration of the education system more difficult; monitoring and
evaluation of external resources does not include government budget M&E. In sum, rather than the bolstering of country systems, donor behaviour within SWAps often brings with it few externalities for national systems, whether for planning, budgeting, monitoring and evaluation, sector reviews, human resource policy, etc.

After one and a half decades of experience with education SWAps it is evident that different donors have approached SWAps in different ways, with the more risk averse less willing to work co-operatively and move away from project aid if this significantly risked reducing their ability to trace the distinct contribution of ‘their aid’. For instance, neither France nor Japan contributes to pooled or sector budget support for education (see Table 5). The greater the number of donors who adopted this way of working and the larger their contribution to education, the more it undermined the different co-operative benefits of the joint approach that SWAps were set up to create—alignment with country systems, joint monitoring reviews (i.e. without additional agency reviews), joint missions, co-ordinated capacity development, etc. The three surveys of the Paris Declaration (OECD 2006, 2008, 2011) carried out illustrate well such donor behaviour. And for their part, some aid-recipient governments participated and went along with SWAps but were reluctant to lean on donors to change old practices and ways of working for fear of losing aid that was more likely to continue to be provided in the old project form (Cambridge Education, Mokoro Ltd. and Oxford Policy Management 2010).

### 3.5 Budget support

The largest, most comprehensive and in-depth evaluation of General Budget Support was undertaken in the mid-2000s, (IDD and Associates 2006) which included seven country case studies, underlining the importance of the increased expenditure and expanded basic services resulting from Partnership General Budget Support (PGBS). The evaluation was preceded by an ‘evaluability’ study addressing the methodological challenges of identifying attribution and causality (Lawson et al. 2003 and Lawson and Booth 2004), and the study used ‘contribution analysis’, drawing a causality map, which addressed the changes from entry conditions considering ‘policy as well as institutional and flow-of-funds effects, and paying special attention to feedback loops within the system’ (IDD 2006:S2). Box 1 summarizes the specific impact of PGBS on education from this evaluation in relation to the seven countries analysed. In many ways the general findings reinforce those of other studies reviewed in this paper—some strong positive (but not universal) results in relation to quantitative improvements, but questions in relation to quality and a lack of firm evidence in relation to institutional strengthening.

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19 Elbers et al. (2007) proposed an alternative evaluation methodology for budget support, commenting that just as donors are increasingly using GBS, they are also interested in statistical impact evaluation methods which are suited for project evaluations and not GBS. ‘Donors want to assess the effectiveness of aid at the sector or national level but it is not clear how this should be done’. It is of interest that the application of their methodology to Zambian education in the early 2000s found that enrolment increases had a strong (negative) effect on educational quality, that the number of teachers had no significant direct effect on quality, and that the number of classrooms and availability of textbooks had only a weak, if significant effect on education quality. To an educationist, such findings, in spite of the greater ‘robustness’, are about as interesting as the early determinants of education studies of Ghana (Glewwe and Ilias 1996) that found that the most significant effect on school attainment was the prevalence of blackboards and whether or not the school had a leaky roof.
The most obvious effects of PGBS on service delivery have been through increased expenditure and expanded basic services (especially in education and health). Other points emerging from the study include the following: that the expansion of basic services has often been accompanied by a deterioration in quality; that other PGBS effects (through policies and, especially, through institutional changes) are likely to take longer in any case; and that improved allocative and operational efficiency of public finance management...allied to PGBS dialogue and performance targets, have considerable potential to address issues of quality and access (IDD and Associates 2003).

Many of the key findings from the analyses of the impact of SWAps in education discussed above are also echoed in a more recent evaluation of sector budget support, (using the same methodology as the GBS study) (Williamson and Dom 2010), and which included country studies of Mali’s and Rwanda’s education sectors specifically. Box 2 synthesises some of the findings from this study, including the expansion of
service delivery and the failure of sector budget support to address adequately the quality of services. The evaluation highlights, additionally, the diminished policy dialogue surrounding education sector budget support, attributing this in part to the deprofessionalization of in-country donor staff, their mobility and the tendency for line ministry policy and planning departments to take the lead on the dialogue. As the authors explain, policy and planning departments ‘tend to be made up of individuals with finance and economics backgrounds who have limited interaction with frontline service providers. They are therefore more comfortable discussing plans and budgets than specific issues relating to service delivery’. Such underlying reasons for diminished policy dialogue affect not only inter-departmental communication within ministries of

Box 2: Education Sector Budget Support Lessons

*Expansion of Service Delivery*

- SBS has generally helped support the expansion of service delivery, through financing a major share of service delivery inputs.
- The contribution that SBS has made to service delivery inputs has certainly ensured that the quality and equity of services is higher than it otherwise would have been in cases where free basic services have been introduced.
- SBS has supported greater efficiency in the use of public resources, through facilitating improvements in planning, the budgeting cycle, financial management and accountability, though progress has been uneven.
- SBS funds have helped facilitate policy implementation, which has reinforced ownership of policies. The relative predictability of SBS funding has helped further. SBS has also helped strengthen government accountability, through supporting the establishment of stronger sector policy and review processes. Over time there is evidence that recipient governments are taking a greater lead in policy making. Financial accountability is also stronger as a result of SBS, but SBS has failed to strengthen accountability for service delivery.

*Understanding and Addressing Quality of Education*

The failure to address management and human resource issues reflect(s) a broader problem, which is that SBS programmes have not responded well in addressing the quality of services. *Lack of attention to service delivery processes-information gap*

The lack of influence of SBS on quality is symptomatic of a lack of attention to service delivery processes when compared to the monitoring of inputs and results, typically defined in terms of outcomes.

*Lack of consensus on what education processes matter most*

Even though there was a proliferation of impact evaluation types of studies, in education at least, there is no general consensus on what process aspects matter most—and an emerging consensus that this is probably context-specific.

*Close management and supervision of service delivery at lower levels lacking*

Tackling quality issues requires a good understanding of the constraints to achieving quality outcomes... and close management and supervision of service delivery at lower levels. SBS programmes have typically not invested in this. Non-financial SBS inputs in the context of SWApS have focused more on upstream policy and monitoring processes.

(Williamson and Dom 2010)
education, but the utility of policy-related research for ministries of education, as will be discussed below concerning knowledge transfer.

4 What could work better in foreign aid to education?

Many of the lessons from the decades of experience of foreign aid to education are well known to donors but most have not been implemented, for a variety of reasons which this section of the paper will discuss. Answering the question, ‘What would work better in foreign aid to education?’ requires one to consider the obstacles to implementation. Problems lie in both the development agencies themselves as well as within the recipient countries. The recent survey of progress made in relation to the Paris Declaration commitments illustrates well how difficult it is to induce behaviour change (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 2011). It shows that five years on from the international commitments, only one of the thirteen targets has been reached, and that only marginally. Indeed, to tick the box on ‘co-ordination of technical co-operation’, a development agency need only to have ‘co-ordinated’ with one other agency: it doesn’t imply co-ordination among all development agencies nor that co-ordination was managed by the recipient country; what is more, the target itself was far from ambitious, aiming only at achieving co-ordination of 50 per cent of technical co-operation.

4.1 Capacity development, knowledge transfer and technical co-operation

One of the great blind spots in foreign aid, generally, relates to capacity development. The problem is not that capacity development has been neglected. Quite the opposite: it has been a major focus of donor aid efforts. The problem lies in the manner in which it has been approached. Donors have decades of ‘capacity building’ experience and huge sums of money have been spent on capacity development. Indeed in recent years, even more has been spent on ‘capacity development’ in part as a risk aversion strategy—trying to ensure that aid monies are being well spent when applying the new aid modalities and facilitating greater alignment with country systems and when more and more aid decisions are being taken and programmes managed by recipient governments (European Commission 2006; Cambridge Education, Mokoro Ltd. and Oxford Policy Management 2010, Annex G). Capacity development failures, however, have continued to be manifested in projects as well as in SWAps, in pooled funds and in budget support programmes. They could be seen as the beam in the donors’ eyes as they point out the mote in recipient governments’. ‘Knowledge transfer’ and ‘technical co-operation’ need to be viewed from within the perspective of the track record of capacity development.

So what precisely is the problem? There are the mantras of good practice in capacity development. For example, the Accra Agenda for Action (2008) stresses the fundamental importance of leadership, management and co-ordination by recipient governments when approaching the issue of building up national institutions and ensuring their effective functioning. Indeed, our understanding of ‘good practice’ in capacity development has moved along the trajectory from ‘gap-filling’ and individual training to paying ‘attention not only to skills and organizational procedures, but also to issues of incentives and governance’, as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) guidance puts it (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 2006a).
Institution building has been clearly highlighted as requiring further attention in the evaluations reviewed above. However, efforts to link foreign aid to institution building and organizational development in a way that builds durable institutions and develops sustainable organizations is where much of the aid effectiveness to education has fallen short.

Monitoring and mentoring the processes and changes needed in what goes on in the classroom to improve the quality of education are crucial linkages that have been highlighted in the evaluations of sector budget support and in the evaluations of education SWAps. Failures to build and sustain adequate capacities in the classroom can easily be seen as problems that national governments have to address: they require national leadership and management as well as real ownership. When, in the world of SWAps, the project director in the Ministry of Education is no longer responsible for reporting on classroom competence and performance to the interested development agency, where does the incentive lie and the monitoring take place to ensure that the required reforms have been institutionalized, and who is overseeing their further development? Who has the incentive to see that this is done? This is where buy-in is so central. Notwithstanding all the talk of the crucial importance and need for local co-ordination and management, what is crucial for the donor—and this may well hold up further disbursements—is that its capacity development plans are followed through. What this leads to is typically the donor continuing to direct, possibly in all but name, a national co-ordinator/manager often being appointed as a counterpart to any technical assistants brought in to do the job. What further complicates the process is that the national co-ordinator may well be one of those whose capacities require further development in order to carry out his role (De Grauwe 2009 including background studies; Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011).

One of the reasons that this approach persists is that the way that capacity development is ‘managed’ by donor agencies. Capacity development projects attract the personnel for the jobs, a request for proposal may be issued by the development agency, to which consultancy firms respond with their rosters of ‘experts’ with the know-how and track records to do the job. Often, a team of people will be chosen, who may never have met each other before, and whose interpersonal skills may well also be an unknown. Local firms and personnel may well be included in the roster, but typically, it is difficult for them to compete with international consultancy firms. And there may well be considerable tokenism in the appointment of locals to the team, without any more knowledge of their track records than their having participated in other such projects (Williams et al. 2003).

Perhaps the technical assistants will have long-term contracts (e.g. 3-4 years); perhaps they will come and go at different stages of the programme. Whatever is organized, how will the capacity development be evaluated? The capacity development could be for planning, EMIS, teacher education, testing, policy analysis, supervision, leadership training, whatever. Is success the education plan, the results-based budget, the EMIS, the new teacher development plan, or the new examinations, to take but a few of the examples? Or is success looking beyond the ‘products’ (including whatever training takes place) to the utilization of what has been learned? Who will be concerned with the sustainability of the capacity development once the donor is no longer investing in that area (and thus project directorships will wane, monitoring may not include the
additional information required, and evaluations may be over too short a time to see impact with longevity)?

When viewed from this perspective, it is easier to see the weaknesses of typical current approaches—at every stage of the process described above. Yet, the development ‘business’ carries on in this way because no one donor is responsible for stepping back and pointing out the weaknesses and no one has the necessary power to change the system, dysfunctional though it clearly is, with livelihoods dependent on its continuity—in the recipient country as well as internationally.

UNESCO’s International Institute for Education Planning (IIEP) has carried out extensive research into capacity development in the education sector20 including two case studies of donor influence on capacity development in education planning in Guyana and Bangladesh (Riddell 2011) in which all of the significant factors emerging from the above review are highlighted. The Mid-term Evaluation of the FTI also focused on capacity development and specifically the Education Programme Development Fund (EPDF)21, one of whose aims was to ensure that credible plans were developed on which FTI funding could be based. The evaluation uncovered the importance of focusing on the process of capacity development and not merely the product.22 When funding is predicated on capacity development, the danger is that it becomes formulaic.

What is particularly worrying is that these problems have been repeatedly highlighted in successive evaluations of capacity development, both within the education sector and beyond. Some of the issues highlighted by the World Bank in a 2005 report on capacity development in Africa are still pertinent (World Bank 2005):

- The fact that public sector capacity building has been treated ‘as a collateral objective’—‘rather than as a core goal in its own right’.23
- Despite capacity building being a priority ‘most activities lack quality assurance processes at the design stage, and they are not routinely tracked, monitored, and evaluated’.24
- Most of the capacity building carried out has been ‘fragmented, on a project basis’ and that ‘the health and education sectors face greater challenges (than others) because they are labour intensive and decentralized, relying on thousands

21 See (Cambridge Education, Mokoro Ltd. and Oxford Policy Management 2010), Volume 3, Appendix IV.
22 The case of Burkina Faso, which underwent two different phases of EPDF-sponsored capacity development is notable. The latter took a longer time and was not foreshortened due to disbursement pressure (Chiche et al. 2010).
24 This is referred to as one of the results of capacity development being considered as a collateral objective. Other aid agencies have taken on capacity development specifically as a building block for their education programmes, especially in SWAps, when greater reliance on nationals and country systems is expected, see European Commission 2006 and OECD 2006a, for instance.
of dispersed frontline service providers’.25

- ‘Where technical assistance (TA) has been used to fill the gaps in skills needed to manage Bank-funded projects, it has had little impact on strengthening client capacity’.26

- ‘Regional operations … have focused on the supply of individual skills in the public sector without ensuring that the skill-building is appropriately synchronized with organizational and institutional changes needed to improve public sector performance’.27

4.2 What do we know about the ‘transferability’ of aid-supported educational programmes?

What we know about the ‘transferability’ of aid-supported educational programmes is closely linked to what we know about bringing to scale any pilot educational projects. It encompasses the following: that the contextualization of programmes into the (unique) political economy of the recipient country and ministry is crucial, that local ownership and national leadership are essential; that capacity development initiatives surrounding the ‘transferred’ programmes are comprehensive, and also locally owned and led; and that there is (always) locally-based co-ordination by those buying in to the programme. If the programme is not only to be successfully transferred but also sustained, then it is also important that those involved need to include not only relevant stakeholders in the central ministry, but key stakeholders ‘down the line’ to the local authorities and to the schools in question.28 What this suggests is that there are really no very ‘new’ lessons coming out of transferability other than those already highlighted above, in section 4.1.

The cumulative and extensive knowledge built up from evaluations and research of educational aid interventions do provide lessons of what might work in different contexts. Hence, development agencies wanting to find quick wins may continue to fund education programmes that have been found to be successful elsewhere, provided they understand the (different) local context. They may also continue to offer the capacity development they assess as being necessary and provide the bulk of the inputs, including finance. However, without ownership and national leadership, and the interconnections within the education system as a whole, such programmes will always continue to be someone else’s agenda. To be successful, education programmes need to be conceived and run systemically. Even short-term interventions need to be conceived within long-term frameworks that relate to the way institutions are run and organized and with an understanding of the way that current incentives work within institutions. Too often donors are keener to apply and transpose institutional models from their own countries to recipient countries, in effect trying to replace those that exist and (however

25 Reference is made to the Ghana Education Sector Project (World Bank 2004).
27 Reference is made to the World Bank’s own regional programmes and World Bank Institute programmes.
28 Five years after Independence, the Minister of Education in Zimbabwe wryly observed that one-third of the parents of those students able to access secondary school places in local newly-built schools chose to send their children to schools further afield for a better quality education, even though the costs to them were far higher (Personal communication).
ineffectually) do function, than they are in understanding how local institutions, embedded in their own political economy, might be more effectively changed. Donors remain to this day keener to focus on a problem and try to fix it quickly than to understand how and why the problem arose in the first place—usually a key to achieving successful outcomes.

The Accra Agenda for Action29 ‘calls for strengthening the capacity of partner countries to lead and manage development. It states that together developing countries and donors will systematically identify areas in which there is a need to strengthen capacity to perform and deliver services at all levels. Donors’ support for capacity development will be demand-driven and designed to support country ownership, and donors and partner countries will work together at all levels to promote operational changes to make capacity development more effective’. This analysis of what needs to be done still provides many of the important pointers to what would help to make aid to education (and to other sectors) more effective. As discussed above, the problem lies less in not knowing what to do than in the failure to implement. The Accra Agenda for Action, like the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness before it, needs to be taken to heart by development agencies and not set aside because of the lack of progress in these very fundamental areas.

4.3 South-South Co-operation

The Busan statement30 which was the key outcome of the most recent (4th) High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness was the first that included the ‘new official donors’, notably India, China and Brazil as well as representatives of civil society organizations in an internationally agreed statement on aid effectiveness. This explains, at least in part, why the Statement seems to water down some of these earlier commitments by referring to ‘differential commitments’ and ‘the ways in which the principles are applied ... across countries at various stages of development, and among the different types of public and private stakeholders involved’. Clearly, South-South and triangular co-operation are important and form part of the increasingly complex ‘jig-saw’ of relationships and stakeholders with roles to play in enhancing the impact and effectiveness of aid. There is the potential for such relationships to differ in practice from North-South co-operation, but there is nothing automatic about South-South co-operation producing more sustainable, quality outcomes.

Box 3 provides examples of South-South co-operation of particular relevance to the education sector, drawn from the documents prepared for the 4th High Level Forum, but no information is provided on whether these initiatives have produced positive outcomes.

One way in which the gap between the rhetoric and the reality of capacity development, institutional development and knowledge transfer might be narrowed is through the incentive system. Clearly, the incentives for deepening aid effectiveness need to be strengthened. As was stated in the overview of South-South co-operation, ‘While setting up South-South learning and knowledge exchange often draws on enormous enthusiasm

29 Accra High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, September 2008.
30 Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (2011) Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, Busan, Republic of Korea, 1 December.
Box 3: Some examples of south-south co-operation in education

**India-East Africa Education Research.** The India-based ASER Centre and the East African civil service organization Uwezo build local capacity for assessing results of education policies in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. The surveys strive to feed into education reforms and to create informed, homegrown, ‘bottom-up pressure’ to effectively improve education systems. Funding is provided by the US Hewlett Foundation. (2008-present) (AP-23).

**NEPAD e-school programme.** The purpose is to accelerate development of information and communication technology (ICT) infrastructure and skills through supporting technical and information-technology-based education. The e-Africa Commission was created in 2001 and adopted as an ICT Task Team by NEPAD in 2002. It is responsible for developing policies, strategies, and projects at the continental level as well as managing the structured development of the ICT sector in the context of NEPAD (2006–2015) (AFR11).

**Bangladesh-Korea ICT training.** The Bangladesh Bureau of Education Information and Statistics (BANBEIS), in collaboration with the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) set up and operates a state-of-the-art Training Center in the country with 5 (five) ICT labs to facilitate building appropriate IT infrastructure (2006-2009) (AP-13).


**Mexican University Exchange Programme** with Belize, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Panama to ‘expand and consolidate systems for transmitting, creating, and applying scientific and technological knowledge by promoting the formation of human resources on priority issues for regional development and the study of the most pressing problems’ (1998-2010) (LAC-41).

**Nigeria—Recovering from brain drain through scientific and technical exchange.** Offering attractive research facilities in African countries such as South Africa and Nigeria to universities, polytechnics, and colleges of education and research centers in Africa. Funding through ADB (1999-present) (AFR-19).

**Colombia Knowledge Exchange with Caribbean Basin.** To consolidate regional economic development. The strategy is centered on the strengthening of institutions in five priority areas: technical education and vocational training, disaster assistance and prevention, food safety and nutrition, bilingualism, and academic mobility (2009-2010) (LAC19).

**Mexico-Chile Strategic Partnership.** Created a joint co-operation fund to finance technical-scientific and education-cultural co-operation programmes, projects, and activities in the public sector (2007-present) (LAC21).

**World Bank—Investing in South-South Knowledge Exchange.** A flexible funding mechanism to facilitate just-in-time knowledge and experience exchanges among development practitioners. Designed to respond to specific demands from low-income countries that want to learn from their counterparts in other developing countries (2008-present) (GL1).

(Extracted from *Boosting South-South Cooperation in the Context of Aid Effectiveness* 2011 Part 2; bracketed numbers correspond to specific interventions.)

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of the involved actors, implementing longer-term activities can face challenges. Frequent changes of decision-makers and officials in the public sectors stand out as a critical factor putting at risk continuity in implementation and accumulation of lessons learned. It is the longer-term sustainability and capacities of the institutions and organizations responsible for the strategic management of the education sector and the co-ordination of foreign aid contributions to it that requires greater attention by all.

4.4 What do we know about the scalability of aid-supported educational programmes?

One of the clear lessons of effective aid to education is that a holistic, systemic view is required. In most cases, this is represented by the education sector development plan and donors then look beyond such a plan for the other macro influences on its implementation: the share afforded to education in public expenditure, teachers’ salaries and allowances and their relationship to public service reform, a sectoral medium-term expenditure framework and a results framework. However, putting all the pieces together is a challenging task, made more complicated by the multiple demands made of education ministries to meet different donors’ requests. Upscaling educational programmes is made more difficult by the fragmentation of donors’ contributions, but if agreement on the co-ordination of different inputs can be reached, the bringing to scale of successful pilot programmes is likely to be more successful. Just the same, the challenges of foreseeing and accommodating appropriately all the linkages within the educational system of any programme will need to be addressed. Thus, for instance, if a new curriculum is piloted and then developed for national implementation, one will need to foresee the changes needed to teacher education—both preservice and inservice; textbooks; assessment; and one will not be able to shy away from the issues of ownership, local management and co-ordination, communication with the wider stakeholder groups, etc. This is the backdrop against which to discuss the scaling-up of (pilot) educational projects and programmes.

The challenges of ‘going to scale’ have been addressed in a number of studies of education reform. Some of the most important insights and lessons from these are discussed below. Samoff et al.’s (2001 and 2011) studies highlight the lack of documentation of pilot education reforms in Africa that have been effectively scaled up to become nation-wide programmes. Their 2011 study relies on a variety of evidence, including much grey literature, building on their earlier review, covering 16 African country reports of experiences with different education programmes. Their findings confirm several lessons that have emerged from African experience discussed above in ‘what works’ (and could work better) in aid to education. The authors underline the importance of charismatic and effective local leadership, strong local demand for the innovation at each site, and adequate (not necessarily high level) funding.

They also warn against various negative effects of upscaling, resulting in the destruction of promising reforms. Local roots need to be cultivated, raising the challenge (to donor-supported programmes) of programme replication, especially where external funding superimposes policies in place of local initiative. The authors emphasize that what needs to be replicated are the ‘conditions that permitted the initial reform to be

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31 Boosting South-South Cooperation in the Context of Aid Effectiveness: Telling the Story of Partners Involved in More than 110 Cases of South-South and Triangular Cooperation, Part 1, 2011.
successful’, pointing to inclusive local participation and the necessary ‘political space for reform’. Their further warnings are against general blueprints, given the need to embrace upscaling as a learning process (Samoff et al. 2011).

The USAID education programme review referred to in Section 2.10 (Gillies 2010) similarly underlines the components of reform that need to be successfully addressed for bringing pilot projects to scale: genuine ownership and leadership at all levels and the sustainability of the reform. As noted above, none of the projects reviewed in (Chapman and Quijada 2009), which fed into the Gillies review, were found to be sustainable. These factors go beyond any positive impact of the individual pilot project itself and therefore provide a wider framework in which the results of such evaluations need to be considered. As was noted, ‘In none of the cases, however, are specific reforms operating at acceptable quality standards on a national scale. In the rush to scale up in a ‘cost-effective’ way, there is a tendency to look for a formula, instead of recognizing that the human process of developing ownership, strengthening new behaviours, and changing systems is done at province-by-province, district-by-district, and school-by-school levels’ (Gillies 2010 referring to the cases of Egypt, El Salvador, Namibia, Nicaragua and Zambia).

A World Bank synthesis of case studies, focusing on bringing to scale development programmes more generally (World Bank 2002) listed a number of lessons, which have fed into the spread of the new aid modalities in aid to education. On the recipient country side, the lessons read as some of the prerequisites for a SWAp, especially the necessary capacity development (OECD 2006a). They include: country commitment to improving policies, governance and institutions; sound policies and committed leadership at the country level (supported by appropriate expenditure frameworks and effective budget execution); community and country ownership; adequate operational capacity to implement at all levels; capacity of communities to participate effectively, and the right incentives. On the side of donors, the lessons for bringing programmes to scale include: external support for change and capacity building; financial resources adequate to scale up programmes that work; and value-for-money considerations as well as government’s seeing the advantages in scaling up. The examples draw on case studies32 which led, for instance to the Indicative Framework used in FTI, which proved controversial (Cambridge Education, Mokoro Ltd. and Oxford Policy Management 2010), precisely because it appeared as a blueprint for transferring ‘best practice’, and thus working against the contextualization that has been emphasized as being necessary in most other evaluations of education outcomes reviewed here.

Evidence of a project’s success is clearly an insufficient basis for upscaling: all three reviews pinpoint the importance of adequate funding, strong demand, adaptability, sufficient capacity to manage the larger-scale intervention and local ownership and leadership as crucial ingredients of success. (Samoff et al. 2011) and (Gillies 2010) both emphasize the importance in upscaling of understanding the conditions and context that enabled the reform to take place before attempting to replicate it and the importance of wide stakeholder involvement.

32 It has been impossible to access the companion volume referred to in their synthesis: Development Effectiveness and Scaling Up: The Case Studies: Accelerating Progress Toward Education for All: Building on Success and Failures, but references on scaling up education programmes, in the first volume (World Bank 2002) are to: Uganda, Malawi, Ghana, El Salvador, Tanzania, Guinea and Madagascar.
5 Concluding remarks

The education sector has accounted for a substantial share of ODA since 1995, between 5 and 8 per cent over this period. And like most of the other social sectors, its share of total ODA has not decreased, but increased slightly (see Table 6). In 2010 total ODA to education was some US$13bn. This paper has shown the positive contribution that this aid has made to education in aid-recipient countries, the most tangible outcome of which has been the contribution made to expanding enrolments especially of basic education. But the paper also indicates that there is a considerable gap between what aid does and what it could potentially achieve, especially in relation to its contribution to improvements in educational quality. However, perhaps the paper’s most important conclusion relates to aid’s contribution to capacity development in education—on the one hand, an issue of central importance, but on the other, one in which the record has been characterized by systemic weaknesses and failures and in which few lessons seemed to have been learned.

If capacity development is at the root of much of what does not work, as well as what could work better in foreign aid to education, how has this been played out across the different factors that have emerged from this review of the evidence? Certainly the complexity of education systems and the multiplicity of factors that influence the outcomes of those who pass through them is a central issue, repeatedly highlighted in this review with clear implications both for enhancing educational outcomes as well as for designing appropriate capacity development policies.

The paper highlights weaknesses of particular approaches. For instance, as the discussion in Section 4 makes clear, projectizing capacity development is not the answer, nor are donor-led capacity assessments that identify ‘gaps’ and then try (all too quickly) to fill them because even when the competencies are developed, their sustainability within a ministry of education has been questionable. Another problem is related to the fact that most ministry of education staff comprise former teachers who have been seconded to the different technical directorates. Typically, there is a disconnect between overall public sector reform and the teaching profession which means that there is usually no clear career path for planners and policy analysts distinct from that of teachers.33

Aid to the education sector has certainly helped to expand the technical skill base of ministry staff, by increasing, especially, the planning and EMIS functions, but, as the paper has shown, donors have repeatedly given priority to skills training to deliver more immediate products such as the plans or the annual school census data over progress in institutional and organizational capacity development, so that insufficient attention has been paid to their use within the ministry: one cannot ‘make’ staff use data unless it serves a purpose. If, or when, the purpose is to ‘supply’ data to donors for ‘their’ accountability rather than for the ministry’s own targeting and resource allocation, then the plans and policy analysis will quickly become more like alien instruments than tools that, embedded in the core workings of the ministry, enhance the government’s ability to respond better to its own demands for information and its use. The same can be said for decentralized levels of the ministry. Data use must be driven by need, not directed

33 Not to mention the typical disconnect of teachers, generally, with public sector reform and the many ways of attempting to square the increased expenditure on teachers’ salaries with enrolment expansion by encouraging teaching contracts outside the civil service.
from on high, or from outsiders, or it will remain someone else’s agenda. Institutional capacity development is certainly urgently needed, and not only to enhance the abilities of the central ministry’s planning department, but of all the departments and throughout the levels of any decentralized administration and management.

Responsibility for the weakness of aid’s contribution to capacity development in education lies not solely with the contributing donors, however. In the absence of national leadership hungry for such capacity development, aid’s contribution will be lessened considerably, given the lack of sustainability of the capacities developed. When donors drive the capacity development agenda, ministry officials may well agree to the proposed capacity development projects and work with donors to help achieve their objectives, and staff may well be trained. But the likelihood of the overall ‘system’ improving—and thus, the outcomes one hopes to achieve, not only of increased enrolments but learning—will be low, as the evidence consistently and repeatedly confirms. Furthermore, because education is always an issue of central political importance in aid-recipient countries (as it clearly is, too, in donor countries), efforts to improve the system will always be more complex than writing plans and expecting outcomes to be achieved merely by deploying technical advisors to train local planners and educationists. What this suggests is the need for broad accountability and transparency of information, such as pointed out by Pritchett, in warning that aid’s bolstering of the state’s role in the provision of education services as a public good (Pritchett 2008) may inadvertently diminish the voice of private (individual and family) stakeholders.

Recent years have seen a marked shift by donors towards greater attention to education quality, no doubt due, in part, to the limited evidence of their aid’s impact as seen in the various evaluations reviewed above: development agencies are belatedly emphasizing some of the broader EFA goals beyond MDG 2, as has been pointed out. And they are financing considerable learning achievement assessments, such as EGRA, but also the regional and international achievement surveys. The danger is that either, like the plans, the EMIS and the policy analysis, the information garnered from these assessments will not be used to focus on improving the system, or that internationally managed assessments will supersede the national assessments required and will utilize the limited, trained staff to focus on trying to achieve objectives other than those nationally owned and understood. In practice the results of such assessments are often not put into the public domain due to government’s embarrassment by the low scores achieved—just when the transparency is needed to engage wider stakeholders in educational improvement.

So, we come back to the main question of this paper, ‘What works in foreign aid to education?’ Perhaps we need to proceed with slightly more humility, by pointing out that the experts are still not agreed about what works in our own educational systems at home. Thus, rather than starting with the bag of tricks that are typically unloaded when they get off the plane to have discussions with ministry staff, education specialists from donor countries might approach their task of trying to help by acknowledging their need to learn as well as to impart knowledge. They could ask for help in trying to model systemic routes aimed at making a difference, not least by focusing more on how better to strengthen local capacities and less on ensuring ‘our’ aid works. This, after all, is what alignment is all about, though it seldom looks like this. The Paris Declaration offered a step-change to the major development agencies. It is clear from the surveys
carried out that most agencies are not living up to their commitments, even when measured by the relatively weak indicators used to judge progress.\textsuperscript{34}

This review has shown that many of the lessons of what works in foreign aid to education are known, but they are not implemented. These lessons are of two sorts, the first cluster relates to the interface of aid with education systems in recipient countries. To make a difference, what is of paramount importance is to start at the level of the whole education sector—rather than to pick out the sub-sector most popular with donors and channel a disproportionate share of funds to make this ‘work’ better, for this distorts a government’s sector-wide planning. (What happens to the menu items that are ‘off’ and so not selected?) Making the Paris Declaration work should be high on the agenda of development agencies—after all they have signed it! There are also lessons for development agencies about how they should behave with each other. Co-operation among donor agencies can only be successful if donors are willing to challenge those of their number whose activities undermine the corporate effort.\textsuperscript{35} This will often mean that countries have to accept, for example, traditional, ring-fenced projects with top-ups paid to ministry staff and essentially, with accountability to development agencies rather than to national institutions even when other development agencies are providing unearmarked budget support.

The second cluster of lessons are those related to the ‘nuts and bolts’ of education systems themselves—what makes them work, how the different bits fit together and how aid monies can distort priorities, making the government co-ordination efforts more difficult as well as creating fragmented accountability. Add to this the projectized capacity development and the untouched institutional or organizational development, together with any lack of leadership or ownership of the capacity development, and the distorting influence of aid monies likely trumps their contributions. This review has demonstrated the distortions of focusing on enrolments and insufficiently on quality, on products such as plans and EMIS, and ‘inputs’, rather than processes and outcomes, what goes on in the classroom, what the students learn, whether the teachers’ pay and status are sufficient to keep them in the classroom and continuing to teach, etc.

At the beginning of this review, it was stated how much easier it is to judge the impact of health rather than educational interventions. Students aren’t dying due to the ineffectiveness of education aid, but many are still not learning or not learning enough. Aid to education and its evaluation needs to be systemic and long-term, and the capacity development that is afforded needs to be nationally managed and co-ordinated. Sustainable education outcomes will not be achieved merely by reproducing yet more successful, but individual projects. Perversely, development agencies that focus only on demonstrable short-term impact may well be contributing, unwittingly, to an undermining of the education systems and their deepening development, to whose progress they are trying to contribute.

\textsuperscript{34} The recent evaluation of the World Bank’s harmonization and alignment (H&A) (Independent Evaluation Group 2011) made the following recommendation: ‘Provide recognition to Bank staff for undertaking H&A by introducing a specific budget code for staff to charge time spent on co-ordination, for both task- and non-task-related co-ordination activities’. This example may be one way of taking forward the need for donor agency staff behaviour to change, as has been underlined here.

\textsuperscript{35} However, there seems to be an unwritten rule that development agencies don’t criticize each other. Thus, they back off making judgments (in public) about each others’ behaviour as one would in a peer-based review.
## Appendix 1: Aid, policies and progress toward EFA in 13 countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total aid (committed) to education (US$m)**</th>
<th>Total aid (disbursed) to education (US$m)¹</th>
<th>Aid (committed) to basic education (US$m)**</th>
<th>Aid (disbursed) to basic education (US$m)²</th>
<th>Net enrolment rate (NER) primary (%)¹</th>
<th>Survival rate to grade 5 (%)²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>136 92 402 273</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>35 65 93 176</td>
<td>90 150</td>
<td>- 85</td>
<td>- 55³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>13 27 91 119</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>8 8 52 57</td>
<td>53 115</td>
<td>35 63</td>
<td>68 82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>22 20 46 106</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>16 3 15 50</td>
<td>17 19</td>
<td>83 89</td>
<td>56 62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>12 67 46 132</td>
<td>562</td>
<td>4 24 19 40</td>
<td>56 286</td>
<td>36 78</td>
<td>56 47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>57 575 94 1167</td>
<td>776</td>
<td>34 379 19 577</td>
<td>261 641</td>
<td>- 90²</td>
<td>62 66²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesina</td>
<td>314 175 188 332</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>74 29 158</td>
<td>48 178</td>
<td>- 96</td>
<td>- 86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>10 112 239 199</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>55 126 95</td>
<td>84 180</td>
<td>52 80</td>
<td>43 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>64 47 47 55</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>47 33 34 18</td>
<td>32 40</td>
<td>76 92</td>
<td>48 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>213 46 263 467</td>
<td>566</td>
<td>195 10 120 213</td>
<td>120 269</td>
<td>- 66³</td>
<td>- 45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>7 72 25 60</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>28 11 7</td>
<td>26 61</td>
<td>- 96</td>
<td>- 45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>7 72 59 219</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>2 49 7 14</td>
<td>215 153</td>
<td>49 99</td>
<td>- 87³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>42 120 305 451</td>
<td>496</td>
<td>18 20 87 26</td>
<td>37 194</td>
<td>96 -</td>
<td>83 92²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>0 130 42 62</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>92 38 17</td>
<td>23 72</td>
<td>56 73</td>
<td>87 -</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Notes:
2 First figure is average 2002-3 annual average total aid to basic education, and next figure is total aid to basic education 2009 (both in 2009 constant $m).
3 Year ending 2005
4 Year ending 2006
5 Year ending 2007
* National estimate.
### BANGLADESH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Achievements/ Challenges</th>
<th>Institutional Environment</th>
<th>Access</th>
<th>Learning</th>
<th>Aid Modality/ Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Close to UPE/ Main challenges: Improving low levels of most indicators.</td>
<td>Aims of Primary Education Development Programme II (PEDPII, 2002): improve quality and access to primary education, improve management and capacity. Policy environment: characterized by high level of donor support and involvement. Strict requirements for registration of non-state providers of education, but lack of ongoing supervision and fragmented distribution of oversight responsibilities among government agencies.</td>
<td>More schools and classrooms; stipends since 2002; ROSP reaching .5m out of school kids; girls secondary stipends</td>
<td>School meals at primary level. Move towards child-centred education. Education for Indigenous Children, operated by BRAC. NGO efforts to improve quality: e.g. PLAN Community Learning for children from disadvantaged communities.</td>
<td>Different SWAs for public and NFE (BRAC) schools; 1989-2007: universal GER has almost been reached with gender balance, but the institutional capacity and quality aspects have not improved much (e.g., low adult literacy rate of 55% and high cycle dropout rate of about 50%); high transaction costs associated with complicated implementation arrangements, especially through the big SWAP introduced in the PEDP-II during the time when the executing agency’s capacity was not sufficient to handle it and when initial necessary conditions for harmonization were not put in place (ADB 2008)</td>
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### BURKINA FASO

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Achievements/ Challenges</th>
<th>Institutional Environment</th>
<th>Access</th>
<th>Learning</th>
<th>Aid Modality/ Comments</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increased primary education NER while improving gender parity. Increased survival rate to grade 5./ Main challenges: Improving low levels of most indicators.</td>
<td>2000 PRSP: focus on primary and nonformal basic education. Ten-year basic education development plan (PDDEB 2002). Goals: expanding basic education; improving the quality and relevance of basic education; intensifying and improving the quality of literacy campaigns; improving planning and management capacities. Civil society involvement in PDDEB through national education coalition. Harmonization of donor support to PDDEB. Joint</td>
<td>Basic education: High priority on school infrastructure, with 37% increase in number of primary school classrooms since 2001. Resources targeted to 20 least educated provinces and to monitoring. Gender equity: waiver of fees for girls in the first year of primary school. Literacy: Fund for Literacy and Non-Formal Education.</td>
<td>Expansion of school canteens in rural areas. 2006 convention on school health care and nutrition. Expansion of bilingual schools. 47% increase in teacher numbers since 2001. Less than 60% can read fluently at the end of primary educ. (Cafferini and Pierrel 2007)</td>
<td>Period covered by the sector-wide programme: 2000-2009 Before 2005: non-budget common fund; after 2005: targeted budget sector support; contribution to a specific account dedicated to MoE expenditure; then non-targeted sector budget support: payment to Treasury without allocation. PGBS has had an impact on poverty reduction related to living conditions through expansion in the delivery of basic services.(IDD and Associates 2006) FTI’s procedures and analytical tools supported the planning efforts of the basic education sub-sector to move closer to</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Review Missions to improve PDDEB monitoring. Centralized public administration, but with 2004 Code for Territorial Communities and 2006 municipal elections marking a new phase in decentralization strategy.

what could be called a ‘credible’ plan enabling additional funds to be invested (Chiche et al. 2010)

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<tr>
<th>Achievements/Challenges</th>
<th>Institutional Environment</th>
<th>Access</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increased primary education NER and survival rate to grade 5. The gender gap both at primary level and at lower secondary level has effectively been closed.</td>
<td>Education Strategic Plans 2000–2005 and 2006–2010, 2009–2013 incorporating Dakar EFA goals. Move towards sector-wide approach involving much dialogue and negotiation with donors. Decentralization, with some funding direct to schools for first time. All schools given operational budgets (2001). Capacity-building to support decentralization.</td>
<td>ECCE: Emphasis on disadvantaged communities. Pre-school year for 5- to 6-year-olds, home-based and family support programmes for children under 5. Basic education: Construction of schools, especially in remote areas. Multigrade approaches to reduce number of ‘incomplete schools’ in border, remote and ethnic minority areas. Multiple shifts in overcrowded schools. Advocacy on benefits of girls’ education through partnerships with NGOs, CSOs. ‘Safe boarding places’ for girls. Youth and adults: Re-entry classes for joining primary or lower secondary. Equivalency courses combining basic education with practical livelihood and life skills. NFE for ‘hard to reach’ groups.</td>
<td>Improvement of toilets and water access in new and existing schools. New curriculum in basic education grades, based on achievement standards and more gender sensitive. Inclusion of locally relevant life skills and HIV/AIDS programmes in schools. Pilot bilingual education programmes in ethnic minority areas. Incentives to recruit teachers locally and attract teachers to rural areas, especially female teachers. Continuous in-service training and teacher development through school clusters. Automatic grade promotion. Reluctance to publicize learning achievement data.</td>
<td>FTI Catalytic Fund monies projectized in spite of existing budget support—‘due diligence’ of WB Trust Funds supervision; contributed to regression of aid effectiveness; fragmented donor projects despite having many aid effectiveness fundamentals, viz. Education Sector Working Group, Partnership Principles, Aid Effectiveness Advisors; M&amp;E fragmented; MoEYS ‘co-ordination’ top-down and fragmented by donor interfaces with technical departments. and multiplicity of committees; Capacity Development Partnership Fund retrofit donors’ capacity development activities into plan and lacks strategic leadership; disconnect of MoEYS with public sector reform which has not moved significantly.</td>
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the slow pace of decentralization and deconcentration reforms.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>ETHIOPIA</th>
<th>Institutional Environment</th>
<th>Access</th>
<th>Learning</th>
<th>Aid Modality/ Comments</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Achievements/ Challenges</td>
<td>Since 1994 Education and Training Policy, strong commitment to EFA, especially UPE by 2015. Three subsequent Education Sector Development Programmes (ESDPs): focus on expanding equitable access to primary and vocational education, restructuring education system and improving quality. Linked to government poverty reduction strategy. A range of donors supporting education. Regular dialogue and joint sector reviews with government to develop ESDPs. Non-state provision: gradual expansion, with better dialogue between NGOs, and government regulation of non-state provision through registration, but concern about quality of teacher training. Regular collection of education data by most districts and regions, but weak analysis.</td>
<td>School Fee abolition. ESDP 3: affirmative actions for females, pastoral and agro-pastoral groups and those with special needs. Some specific approaches for pastoralist children: mobile schools, boarding hostels. Strategies to promote girls’ enrolment: community sensitization campaigns, improving safety by accompanying girls to school, reducing distance travelled, improving toilets and sanitation. For out-of-school children: alternative basic education, providing link to upper primary; but coverage still low. 2006 MoE special needs education strategy.</td>
<td>Continuous assessment and automatic promotion for grades 1 to 3. Teacher reforms with focus on pre- and in-service training. Quotas encouraging more female teachers in rural schools and more women in education management. Leadership and Management Programme: nationwide initiative to upgrade skills of primary and secondary school principals. Distribution of free textbooks to disadvantaged students. Establishment of a Master’s programme in Adult Education and Lifelong Learning in 2007. Key pro-poor policies and initiatives to improve education outcomes</td>
<td>International co-operation and development finance is likely to have contributed to Ethiopia’s progress, accounting for around 17% of projected education expenditure in 2010 (UNESCO 2009). The multi-donor General Education Quality Improvement Programme (GEQIP) was launched in 2009, with the aim of implementing a new curriculum, providing textbooks and teacher guides, improving teacher training and building administrative capacity (World Bank 2008). Supported by a US$50 million (IDA) credit, it is expected to leverage a collective investment of US$417 million in additional resources from the government, the FTI Catalytic Fund and other development partners (ODI 2011) FTI had only limited impact on the local planning processes and at times had a detrimental effect due to lack of clarity and delays. The main value added by the FTI appears to have been an element of increased rigour to the national planning process and eventually additional financial to support the implementation of those plans (Dom 2010 and Bermingham 2011)</td>
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<td>Achievements/Challenges</td>
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<td>High level of primary education NER; significantly improved adult literacy and gender parity./Main challenges: Providing primary education to socially marginalized minority groups; reducing dropout rate in primary education; improving quality of learning.</td>
<td>Constitutional amendment (2002) making education for ages 6 to 14 a fundamental right for all. National Child Rights Commission (2006). Ongoing work to enact a ‘right to education’ law. Memoranda of understanding with nonstate providers clarifying responsibilities in service delivery to disadvantaged populations. The GOI’s goals for SSA, which began in 2001, were for: a) all 6-11 year olds to complete five years of primary schooling by 2007; and b) all 6-14 year-olds to complete eight years of elementary schooling by 2010.</td>
<td>Basic education: since 1975, much expanded Integrated Child Development Scheme covering nutrition, health and pre-school education nationwide. Small schools (one teacher/one classroom) to increase access. Backward Region Grant Fund to reduce disparities in poorest regions. Incentives to increase demand and reduce cost for the poor, particularly girls: midday meals, school uniforms, free textbooks. National Programme for Education of Girls at Elementary Level. Residential schools for girls. Youth and adults Programmes such as Jan Shikshan Sansthan, offering vocational training for 14- to 26-year-olds</td>
<td>New National Curriculum Framework (2005): child centred co-operative learning; revised syllabuses and textbooks. Assessment of student learning through government (NCERT: National Council of Educational Research and Training) and non-government organizations (Pratham); in Karnataka, state School Quality Assessment Organization. Decentralized countrywide on-site support to teachers through Block- and Cluster-level Resource Centres. NCERT: framework for school quality indicators in preparation, for assessing and grading schools. Support for principle of mother tongue. In Andhra Pradesh, instruction in eight tribal languages since 2003. Distribution of free textbooks to disadvantaged students. Promotion of ICTs in education: SchoolsNet supports creation of schools</td>
<td>Largest WB funded education programme in 1990s (District Primary Education Programme) with multiple donors’ support, streamlined to govt’s own ‘EFA’, Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan, and fewer donors welcomed. The SWAp featured joint support by DfID, the EU and IDA (WB) (together committing more than US$1 billion over the period 2004 to 2007.) Increase in private education challenges quality EFA for all. A host of district level database managers were trained to start up and maintain the M&amp;E system, nevertheless there are still quality control issues and low demand for the data in decision making.</td>
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</table>
networks to enhance teaching and learning through collaboration and information sharing. A majority of rural students in India are not acquiring basic reading and math skills at an early age. (GOI 2010) DPEP Evaluation: the main conclusion that can be drawn is that while there has been some improvement in average learning outcomes under DPEP I and II, despite rapid increases in enrolments, the absolute levels of basic knowledge and skills in project (mostly rural) is still very low in most locations.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>INDONESIA</th>
<th>Achievements/Challenges</th>
<th>Institutional Environment</th>
<th>Access</th>
<th>Learning</th>
<th>Aid Modality/Comments</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increased pre-primary education GER. Increased adult literacy rate/Main challenges: Reducing large number of out-of-school children. Improving survival rate to grade 5.</td>
<td>2003 EFA National Plan of Action: detailed EFA targets for 2015, integrated into 2005-2009 MoE strategy. Each province has own strategic education plan. Decentralized education since 2001; overall strategy of community-based school management. National movement for completion of basic education involving parents, communities.</td>
<td>ECCE: Expanded pre-primary schools in rural areas. Basic education: Multiple shifts in overcrowded schools. Pilots to test other approaches to reach poor and remote communities. School-community partnerships to support students at risk of dropping out. Youth and adults: Non-formal re-entry and equivalency programmes.</td>
<td>Outcome-based curriculum. Mother tongue in early grades outside Bahasa Indonesia areas. Efforts to improve teacher qualifications.</td>
<td>Four major development partners supporting basic education: AusAID, the EC, the Netherlands and the WB. Lack of agreement on what is entailed in SWAp despite support; aligned in terms of the overall Renstra (education development plan), but fragmented in terms of internal co-ordination within the ministry. Following enrolment increases, focus on quality of education and regional disparities. Government committed to upgrading all teachers’ qualifications, certifying teachers and schools and applying national education standards. Thus, post-basic education should continue reform agenda.</td>
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MOZAMBIQUE

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<th>Achievements/Challenges</th>
<th>Institutional Environment</th>
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<th>Learning</th>
<th>Aid Modality/Comments</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increased by primary NER and improved gender parity. Improved survival rate to grade 5./Main challenges: Extending pre-primary coverage from low level. Further expanding primary enrolment, in particular for girls. Improving low levels of youth and adult literacy.</td>
<td>Education Sector Strategic Plan II (2005–2009): based on National Education Policy (1995) as well as ESSP I. Continued commitment to EFA and MDGs. Broader strategy of public sector reform, emphasizing decentralization, improved management, strengthened capacity at all levels. Directorate for Adult and Non-Formal Education within MoE, with provincial and district-level representation.</td>
<td>2005 abolition of school fees. New strategy for adult and non-formal education, based on research and stakeholder consultation. Expansion of adult literacy classes.</td>
<td>New curriculum for primary education: mother tongue instruction in early grades, transition later to national language (also in in-service teacher training). Increase in female recruits in pre-service teacher training institutions. HIV/AIDS training for teachers and managers. Increased management and training for school principals. Direct Support to Schools, providing direct grants for learning materials and supplies.</td>
<td>FTI has had a negative impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of aid due to 1) the protracted negotiations over the disbursement channel for FTI funds and the resultant reduction in harmonization; and 2) the renegotiation of the common fund procedures, making exceptions for the WB, particularly in procurement and reporting. This reversed the steps made towards aid effectiveness and alignment outlined in the 2006 MoU. FTI was particularly effective in influencing policy decisions in two areas: teacher training and low cost classroom construction. Despite capacity development having been one of the main objectives of the two education sector programmes over the past ten years, FTI had little direct influence in this area and a negative impact in some respects. A capacity development strategy was not included within the accelerated classroom construction programme and due to this the programme has run into difficulties. EPDF funds have also been used for a variety of ad-hoc purposes. (Bartholomew et al. 2010)</td>
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NICARAGUA

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<th>Achievements/Challenges</th>
<th>Institutional Environment</th>
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<th>Aid Modality/Comments</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increased pre-primary school GER. Increased primary education NER. Increased</td>
<td>National Education Plan 2001–2015 and MoE Joint Work Plan 2005–2008, aligned with the National Development Plan aimed at meeting EFA</td>
<td>ECCE: Expanded community pre-school education centres, located mainly in rural and urban areas of</td>
<td>Measures to address early school failure: elimination of automatic promotion, introduction of educational</td>
<td>The most effective advances in CD have been delivered through the SWAp process. The joint working arrangements and reviews that the SWAp process entails have permitted the officials of the MOE to</td>
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survival rate to grade 5. Main challenges: Addressing subnational economic disparities in access to primary school and in retention. Reducing high repetition rates. Increasing survival to grade 5 from very low level. Improving low level of learning achievements in national assessments.


extreme poverty, mostly with teachers lacking formal qualifications. Basic education: Grants to reduce school costs for very poor households, especially in rural areas; e.g. Social Protection Network, providing conditional cash transfers to increase enrolment and retention in primary school. School meal programmes in disadvantaged areas to reduce dropout. Children with disabilities: endorsement of inclusive education, but disregarded in practice.

upgrading programme for grades 1 and 2. Pilot of new curriculum based on competencies. Efforts by MoE to keep parents informed about school performance; use of national assessment results to address weaknesses (e.g. academic guides, management training for principals).

improve their capacities for leadership and management of the sector. The FTI contributed to these advances in that it was one of the factors that led to the establishment of the Sector Roundtable and to the launching of the SWAp. Capacity development initiatives continue to be fragmented over numerous projects and there is no clear shared vision on how to move forward. In addition, the selection of the WB grant modality as the aid delivery instrument for FTI-CF allocations has also meant that possible indirect effects on capacity building—through the use of the national financial systems and procedures—have not been achieved. (Visser-Valfrey et al. 2010)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improved primary education NER, literacy and gender parity.</td>
<td>National Education Plan (2000–2010), National Action Plan for EFA (2001–2015), and short- and medium-term plans. Decentralization: responsibility for policy formulation at federal level, with provinces responsible for delivery and teacher training. Monitoring a priority; National Education Census.</td>
<td>Stipend and voucher programmes for girls in secondary education. Many NGO non-formal programmes for working children and others: Community School for Gypsy Children, Community Based School Programmes for Girls, Zindagi Trust programmes.</td>
<td>Twana Pakistan: school nutrition programme for 5- to 12-year-olds. Planned new curriculum with focus on integrated national curriculum framework. 2002 madrasa reform: introduction of secular subjects into curriculum. Gender-sensitive textbooks. Examination system emphasizing rote learning. 2007 pilot of National Education Assessment System for grades 4, 8. Increased use of contract teachers. Donor and aid to Pakistan is dominated by a small number of large donors: the WB, ADB, USAID, Japan and the UK. Most external funds have been disbursed through project modalities. Weak capacity hampers policy and planning at federal and provincial levels and is also a central challenge to education management at the district level. There are serious issues in terms of personal, organizational, and institutional capacities at all levels. Since decentralization, the district government is responsible for the day to day planning and delivery of education. Weak capacity often reflects systemic weaknesses 'Development budget' activities, including capacity development, tend to be left to the donors, but, in the absence of effective national capacity development strategies, donor inputs are likely to be projectized.</td>
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NGO efforts to improve teacher training: AED Pakistan Teacher Education and Professional Development Programme to upgrade mathematics, science, English-language skills. Excessively focused on individual training and gap-filling, and of doubtful sustainability. (Lister et al. 2010)

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<th>RWANDA</th>
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<td>Learning</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aid Modality/Comments</td>
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<td>Increased primary education NER. Significantly decreased repetition rate in primary education. Main challenges: Improving school quality and youth and adult literacy from current low levels.</td>
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<td>2003 Education Sector Policy, which led to Education Sector Strategic Plan (ESSP) based on Long Term Strategy and Financial Framework, including commitment to MDGs, nine-year basic education cycle, and science and technology. Both guided by government’s Vision 2020 and poverty reduction strategy. ESSP update, involving wider stakeholder consultations. 2000 Decentralization Policy and Strategy: local participation and power to raise revenue. Ongoing civil service reforms since 1998, leading to decentralized procurement, budget management and service.</td>
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<td>The education sector in Rwanda had already largely moved from project to sector budget support in the first half of the 2000s and most donors were delivering their support through sector budget support under the Joint Education Sector Support (JESS) agreement. (Bermingham 2011) GBS enabled government to fund activities related to PRSP priorities such as ‘fee-free’ primary education. One of the most positive results of PGBS in Rwanda has been additional external resources for the budget facilitating government spending on priorities, including the expansion of basic social services. (IDD and Associates 2006 Study) Increases in enrolment resulted from a policy shift to free education, to which SBS contributed early, which in turn has contributed to gradual increases in literacy rates. From the introduction of SBS in 2000, enrolment had increased by 46% by 2007—an additional 670 thousand pupils. Subsequently SBS facilitated this expansion through funding the provision of service delivery inputs such as classroom construction, instructional materials and paying for contract teachers. In recent times, SBS has funded a major share of these inputs, with transfers rising from 11% of sector expenditures in 2006 to 48% in...</td>
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<td>TANZANIA</td>
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<td><strong>Institutional Environment</strong></td>
<td><strong>Access</strong></td>
<td><strong>Learning</strong></td>
<td><strong>Aid Modality/Comments</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Improved quality indicators. Increased literacy levels and gender parity. Main challenges: Decreasing large number of out-of-school children.</td>
<td>National EFA Action Plan 2003–2015, linked to government’s Education Development Strategy 2000–2010. Administrative reform and decentralization to provincial and district levels. National targeted programme of funding for poorer provinces and support for provincial EFA planning, guided by national</td>
<td>ECCE programmes with emphasis on ethnic minority and poor urban areas. Basic education: Classroom construction and rehabilitation targeting rural and ethnic minority areas. Multigrade classes in mountainous ethnic minority areas. Multiple</td>
<td>New learner-centred curriculum. Pilots of bilingual approaches in ethnic minority areas. Better textbook provision, linked to development of private publishing; rental fees replaced by loan programme. Teacher incentives for work in</td>
<td>Recent PRSCs include policy actions to improve service delivery in health and education; it is too early to judge their effect, but their potential impact is significant. PGBS has supported nonincome poverty reduction through increasing the use of health and education services by poor groups. (IDD and Associates 2006)</td>
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</table>
**YEMEN**

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<th>Achievements/ Challenges</th>
<th>Institutional Environment</th>
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<th>Learning</th>
<th>Aid Modality/ Comments</th>
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<tr>
<td>Increased primary education NER. Improved gender parity at all levels of education. Increased adult literacy rate.</td>
<td>2002 National Basic Education Strategy, which aims for UPE and school quality, with emphasis on girls' access. Ongoing development of unified monitoring system of the national strategy. Lack of ECCE in national education policies; weak role of government in the sector.</td>
<td>ECCE: Work with religious leaders and local communities to change perceptions about early childhood and girls' education. Basic education: Increase in coeducational and female-only schools, particularly in rural areas, and reduction of male only schools. Sustained construction of schools, though not enough to meet enrolment growth. Waiving of school fees for girls in all grades of primary school and for boys in grades 1 to 3 in</td>
<td>Revised curriculum and teaching methods to make schools more 'girl-friendly'. New ECCE diploma at Sana’a University to increase numbers of qualified teachers.</td>
<td>There were 3 FTI grant phases, all managed like a traditional WB project through the support of a programme administration unit. The 2003 FTI proposal initiated the development of the first medium term implementation plan of NBEDS with costed strategies. This became de facto the road map for both the government and the development partners clearly influencing the design of the multi-donor-funded BEDP. The FTI fund helped identify priority programmes in the area of access. However, over the period, FTI lost its strategic inputs into national planning, and the project nature of FTI-CF support induced parallel planning processes at governorate/district levels. The 2009 country status report comprised a first step toward an integrated vision for the whole</td>
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improve girls’ education. 2006. sector, promoting better policy dialogue and co-ordination between the three ministries in charge of education. While the BEDP has been envisaged as the precursor to a full SWAp there is currently no plan or timetable for the transition to a SWAp. There are also no indications that further major donors may join the sub-sector. (Duret et al. 2010)


Some of the information in the above country table is extracted from (UNESCO 2008) Table 4.9 for some of the main education aid-recipient countries, updated where possible from (UNESCO 2011b) and utilizing some of the EFA policy information from some of the countries included on p.221ff in (UNESCO 2008) plus further detail, as referenced in the table itself.
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Boosting South-South Cooperation in the Context of Aid Effectiveness: Telling the Story of Partners Involved in More than 110 Cases of South-South and Triangular Cooperation 2011, Part 2.


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Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005).


Samoff, J., M. Dembélé, and E.M. Sebatane (2001). Scaling up by Focusing Down: Creating Space to Expand Education Reform, ADEA Biennial Meeting: Reaching
Out, Reaching All—Sustaining Effective Policy and Practice for Education in Africa, Session 1 From Pilot to Scale: Issues and Experience, Arusha, Tanzania.


Table 1: Total and sub-sectoral ODA to education (constant 2010 US$m) (all donors)

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2010</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US$m</td>
<td>% total</td>
<td>US$m</td>
<td>% total</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total aid</td>
<td>2,888.237</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>6,376.738</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level unspecified</td>
<td>1,408.548</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>1,781.985</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic education</td>
<td>542.801</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2,038.808</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary education</td>
<td>334.729</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>685.815</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-secondary</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>1,870.129</td>
<td>29</td>
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</table>

Table 2: A summary of some recent, representative random controlled trials in education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author(s) (year of study)</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Publication (year and web link)</th>
<th>Type of policy intervention under analysis</th>
<th>Country/region (rural/urban)</th>
<th>Methodology</th>
<th>Sampling and sample size</th>
<th>Outcome variables used</th>
<th>Main findings incl. impact size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ferreira, Francisco H. G., Filmer, Deon, and Schady, Norbert (2005-2007)</td>
<td>Own and Sibling Effects of Conditional Cash Transfer Programmes Theory and Evidence from Cambodia</td>
<td>World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5001 (2009) (<a href="http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/EdStats/KHMimp09a.pdf">http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/EdStats/KHMimp09a.pdf</a>)</td>
<td>Scholarships for poor female students</td>
<td>Cambodia (Rural)</td>
<td>Two-period schooling decision partial equilibrium regression discontinuity model</td>
<td>100 schools/800 middle schools in scholarship programme in five provinces offering 3,800 student scholarships/26,537 applicants; households from schools selected randomly from these provinces</td>
<td>Drop-out scores, work for pay, work without pay, siblings work</td>
<td>Increased attendance, but no better achievement &gt;18mos; Scholarship recipients were more than 20 percentage points more likely to be enrolled in school and 10 percentage points less likely to work for pay.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Conditiona l cash transfers in education: design features, peer and sibling effects evidence from a randomized experiment in Colombia</td>
<td>NBER Working Paper No. 13890 (2008) (<a href="http://www.nber.org/papers/w13890">http://www.nber.org/papers/w13890</a>)</td>
<td>Three treatments: a basic conditional cash transfer based on school attendance, a savings treatment that postpones a bulk of the cash transfer due to good attendance to just before children have to re-enroll, and a tertiary treatment where some of the transfers are conditional on students’ graduation and tertiary enrollment rather than attendance.</td>
<td>Bogota, Colombia (Urban)</td>
<td>RCT. Simple difference estimates, then with controls for individuals and families, then an instrumental variables model to estimate externalities, OLS.</td>
<td>Random allocation of about 10,000 treatments were made to about 17,000 registered children following a recruitment drive. This model enabled randomization at the child-level, generating variation within schools, families, and networks of friends. The randomization was stratified on locality, type of school (public</td>
<td>Attendance rates</td>
<td>On average, the combined incentives increase attendance, pass rates, enrollment, graduation rates, and matriculation to tertiary institutions. Taken together, all of the cash incentive treatments generate significant changes in the behaviour of students directly treated by the programme. Students are more likely to attend school (2.8%), more likely to remain enrolled (2.6%), more likely to matriculate to the next grade (1.6%), more likely to graduate (4.0%), and more likely to matriculate to a tertiary institution (23%). For daily attendance, the effect is much stronger for students who would not have met the attendance target without the program. Simply changing the timing of the transfer with the savings incentive increases enrolment in both secondary and tertiary institutions over the basic treatment (by 3.6% and 3.3% respectively) while not reducing the daily attendance rates of students despite the lower monthly transfers. Compared to the basic treatment, the tertiary treatment encourages higher levels of daily attendance (3.5% more for students least likely to attend) and higher levels of enrolment at the secondary (3.3%) and tertiary levels (46%). Important spillover effects of the programme are observed.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kremer, M and Miguel, E. (1998-2000)</td>
<td>Worms: Identifying Impacts on Education and Health in the Presence of Treatment Externalities</td>
<td><em>Econometrica</em> 72, 1 (2004) (<a href="http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~emiguel/pdfs/miguel_worms.pdf">http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~emiguel/pdfs/miguel_worms.pdf</a>)</td>
<td>Group-level randomization to identify peer effects; probit estimation with non-experimental method for decomposing direct and within-school indirect externality effects.</td>
<td>Kenya (Rural)</td>
<td>Health and education outcomes: effect of deworming; attendance and school exam scores</td>
<td>Deworming increased school participation in treatment schools by at least seven percentage points, a one-quarter reduction in total school absenteeism. Within-school participation externality benefits were positive and statistically significant (5.6 percentage points) for untreated pupils in the treatment schools in the first year of the programme. The average school participation gain for treatment schools relative to comparison schools across both years of the project is 5.1 percentage points. The estimated differences in test scores between pupils in treatment and comparison schools are −0.032 standard deviations for the first year posttreatment and 0.001 standard deviations for the second year, neither of which is significant, nor are the within-school externality effect estimates statistically significant.</td>
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<td>Andrabi, Tahir, Das, Jishnu and Khwaja, Asim (2004-5)</td>
<td>Report Cards: The Impact of Providing School and Child Test-scores on Educational Markets</td>
<td>The Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (2009) (<a href="http://www.povertyactionlab.org/publication/report-cards-impact-providing-school-and-child-test-scores-educational-markets">http://www.povertyactionlab.org/publication/report-cards-impact-providing-school-and-child-test-scores-educational-markets</a>)</td>
<td>Detailed information of externally collected data on performance, intensively disseminated to parents, teachers, and school administrators</td>
<td>Punjab, Pakistan (Rural)</td>
<td>Test scores at the student and school level in Urdu, Maths and English, school fees, school inputs, teacher effort, and household inputs</td>
<td>Initially bad (below median baseline test scores) private schools respond by increasing quality - showing learning gains of 0.34 standard deviations - or shutting down, but show limited fee changes. In contrast, initially good (above median) private schools show no learning gains, but drop fees substantially. Government schools see a tenth of a standard deviation increase in learning. Report card provision improves learning by 0.10 standard deviations and decreases private school fees by 21 per cent, with very small changes in school switching and moderate increases in overall enrolment.</td>
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<td>Muralidharan, Karthik and Sundaraman, Venkatesh (2005-7)</td>
<td>Teacher Performance Pay: Experimental Evidence from India</td>
<td><em>Journal of Political Economy</em> Vol. 119, No. , pp. 39-77 (2011) (<a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/659655">http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/659655</a>)</td>
<td>Experimental design using pooled group and incentive dummy variable at school level regressed on test scores (with separate student, grade, and school fixed effects), and sample of 300 government-run primary schools</td>
<td>Andhra Pradesh, India (Rural)</td>
<td>End of year student assessments using independent tests based on syllabus. Teacher behaviour in response to</td>
<td>1. +2 years: students in incentive schools performed significantly better than those in control schools by 0.27 and 0.17 standard deviations in math and language tests respectively. Positive spillovers in non-incentive subjects. 2. Schools receiving the input programmes scored 0.08 SD higher than those in comparison schools. The incentive programmes had a significantly larger impact on learning outcomes (0.22 versus 0.09 SD). The mean treatment effect of 0.22 SD and a</td>
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<td>Mean bonus of 3% of annual pay) and individual bonuses based on teacher performance. 2. Parallel initiative for different set of schools provided with an extra contract teacher, and with a cash grant for school materials respectively.</td>
<td>Mean bonus of 3% of annual pay) and individual bonuses based on teacher performance. 2. Parallel initiative for different set of schools provided with an extra contract teacher, and with a cash grant for school materials respectively.</td>
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<td>With 100 schools each in the group and individual incentive treatment groups and 100 schools serving as the comparison group. Sampling 5 districts across each of the 3 socio-cultural regions of AP in proportion to population with random selection of one division and then random sample of 10 mandals in the selected division. Random sample of 10 schools in each mandal with probability proportional to enrolment.</td>
<td>With 100 schools each in the group and individual incentive treatment groups and 100 schools serving as the comparison group. Sampling 5 districts across each of the 3 socio-cultural regions of AP in proportion to population with random selection of one division and then random sample of 10 mandals in the selected division. Random sample of 10 schools in each mandal with probability proportional to enrolment.</td>
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<td>Minimum average treatment effect of 0.1 SD at every percentile of baseline test scores for group incentive. Average treatment effect was 0.28 SD in the individual incentive schools compared to 0.15 SD in the group incentive schools.</td>
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</table>

**References**


Strengthening school committees through grants (US$70) + one or combination of:

- Indonesia (Rural)
- Two-stage sampling, pairwise impact evaluation+ qualitative
- Dropout rate, repetition rate, and test scores in Indonesian
- Only linkage has significant results: test scores in Indonesian improve by 0.17 standard deviation and 0.22 for linkage+election of committee members

Indonesia (Rural)

Two-stage sampling, pairwise impact evaluation+ qualitative

Dropout rate, repetition rate, and test scores in Indonesian

Only linkage has significant results: test scores in Indonesian improve by 0.17 standard deviation and 0.22 for linkage+election of committee members

India (Rural)

RCT: OLS and 2SLS estimation

Students: basic competency exams controlled for baseline results. Teacher attendance rates: number of ‘valid’ days teaching.

The absence rate (measured using unannounced visits both in treatment and comparison schools) changed from an average of 42% in the comparison schools to 22% in the treatment schools; +1 year: test scores in programme schools were 0.17 standard deviations higher than in the comparison schools and children were 40% more likely to be admitted into regular schools.
Communit y Participation: Results from a Random-ized Field Experimen t in Indonesia (http://www-wds.worldbank .org/external/defaultWDSCo ntentServer/WDSP/IB/2011/0 9/13/000158349_20110913 123202/Rendered/PDF/WPS 5795.pdf) training, democratic election and/or linkage of school committee members with village committee. research and Maths

Source: Ferreira et al. (2009), Kremer and Miguel (2004), Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2011), Duflo and Hanna (2005), Pradhan et al. (2011) and Andrabi et al. (2009).
Table 3: ODA to education sector by type of aid, 2010 (US$m)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of aid</th>
<th>US$m</th>
<th>% total aid to education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sector Budget Support</td>
<td>723.259</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pooled/Basket Fund</td>
<td>365.344</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Support</td>
<td>6,350.183</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experts/TA</td>
<td>1,445.079</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scholarships/ student costs in donor countries</td>
<td>3,473.006</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral and international NGO support</td>
<td>730.579</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to NGOs, private bodies, PPPs, research institutes</td>
<td>203.624</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7.571</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13,298.645</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: A summary of some evaluations of USAID education programmes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author(s) (year of study)</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Type of policy intervention under analysis</th>
<th>Country/region (rural/urban)</th>
<th>Methodology</th>
<th>Sampling and sample size</th>
<th>Outcome variables used</th>
<th>Main findings incl. impact size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hebert, Paul, Randolph, Elizabeth and Udedi, Bertha (1999-2001)</td>
<td>Comprehensive Evaluation of Quality Education Through Supporting Teaching (QUEST) USAID Consultants’ Evaluation (2002) <a href="http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDABW641.pdf">http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDABW641.pdf</a></td>
<td>Increased budgetary resources to primary education and to primary level learning materials; implement a community school system; increase the number of teachers and their training; increase the supply of learning materials in primary schools, and increase the supply of classrooms; reduce repetition and late entry in all standards and improve the analytical and planning capacity of the Ministry of Education (MOE); and improve the relevance of primary education for girls through gender appropriate teacher training, gender appropriate curricula, a scholarship programme for secondary school girls and the introduction of Malawi (Rural)</td>
<td>Longitudinal, repeated measures design with matched comparison group of schools as control.</td>
<td>Baseline and follow-on data collection in 6 schools in each of the three target Districts in 1999. Data from five matched schools in Salima added to the longitudinal study as a control measure in 2000. 122 teacher surveys (Standard 1 to Standard 4 teachers); 24 from Mangochi; 49 from Blantyre Rural; and 49 from Balaka. 27 classroom observations in schools within the QUEST Districts and 24 in the five control schools in Salima. Data from the QUEST monitoring and evaluation system: longitudinal study, pupil dropout and replication study, and the integrated curriculum study.</td>
<td>Pupil performance in Maths, Chichewa reading, and English reading using a set of performance-based, curriculum-bound instruments</td>
<td>Grade 3: Results favoured project schools in all three subjects. Grade 4: Project schools outperformed non-project schools in Maths, only marginally outperformed comparison schools in English, underperformed comparison schools in Chichewa. Grade 5: Project schools outperformed in Maths, only slightly outperformed in English, essentially comparable in Chichewa. For Mathematics, pupils in the QUEST Schools consistently performed, on the average, 17.4 percentage points higher than pupils in non-QUEST schools. (No significance reported, nor SDs)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Name of Study</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Study Details</td>
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<tr>
<td>Clark, Leon E. and Pearson, Robert P. (1992-95)</td>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>Improved classroom techniques to enhance girls’ achievement.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Continuous assessment of classroom and teacher materials, GOS documents and reports, commissioned studies and general background material relevant to education in Swaziland.</td>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>2,410 Grade 1 Maths students in 1992 down to 97 students in 1995.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Test data collected sometimes systematically and sometimes sporadically over the last three years of the project, using baseline data collected prior to the introduction of CA in grades 1-4, end-of-year CA-based examinations collected less systematically.</td>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>Suggestive findings (No significance reported) Grade 1 Maths, increase of 3% in mean score over 2 years, with number of students achieving 80% mastery increasing from 36% (1992) to 40% (1993) to 51% (1994). Grade 1 English, mean scores rise from 19 (1992) to 24 (1994) while the per cent of students scoring in the two highest categories increases from 12% (1992) to 29% (1993) to 34% (1994). Grade 2 Math and English show similar increases in mean scores and in proportions of student scores at the high-end of the score distribution.</td>
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<td>The QUIPS Programme Evaluation Team (1997-2003)</td>
<td>Ghana (Rural/Urban)</td>
<td>In-service teacher professional development including: professional development of district level trainers; school-based INSETs; and residential professional development for teachers, head teachers, and circuit directors.</td>
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<tr>
<td>A Look at Learning in Ghana: The Final Evaluation of USAID/Ghana’s Quality Improvement in Primary Schools (QUIPS).</td>
<td>USAID Consultants’ Evaluation (2005)</td>
<td>HLM: project schools matched with control schools with pre- and post-testing of same children 3x to measure learning growth; ANCOVA: static achievement performance of grades 4 and 6 in project and control schools.</td>
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<td>16 schools in eight districts. Three of the 16 were urban. Four schools were selected in each district: high-performance QUIPS, low QUIPS, high-performance control and low control.</td>
<td>Ghana (Rural/Urban)</td>
<td>In pre- and post-testing in mathematics, spoken English, and English literacy, (1) comparisons of pupil achievement growth during the two-year intervention cycle; (2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Programme</td>
<td>Supervisors</td>
<td>Investigated for residual effects of project on learning outcomes.</td>
<td>Exploratory study of the residual effects from the end of the intervention cycle through the second year after the withdrawal of active QUIPS interventions; and (3) descriptive analysis of the types of skills and general class performance of pupils completing Grades 3, 4, 5, and 6 in QUIPS and control schools.</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Horizons for Primary Schools/Jamaica: Formative Evaluation</td>
<td>USAID Consultants’ Evaluation (2002) <a href="http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDABY194.pdf">http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDABY194.pdf</a></td>
<td>A multi-method design, consisting of inventories, checklists, classroom observation forms, and focused interviews, to measure the conditions in place for effective learning in NHP classrooms. Data analysis consisted of calculating the absolute and</td>
<td>A stratified sample of 35% of project schools was drawn from the universe of 72 schools. Schools were stratified by size (small, medium, or large) and type (primary or all age) then randomly selected within strata. Those schools that had been most</td>
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<tr>
<td>Innovative maths</td>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>Mixed results, over 3 years: In Language Arts, project girls out-performed comparison group girls by 3.3%; project boys out-performed nonproject boys by 0.4%. In Math, non-project</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
and literacy programs through: in-service teacher training in reading and mathematics; governance and leadership training for schools, communities and parents; parent education and training; selective nutritional programmes; reading and mathematics materials; establishing computer use in schools and training teachers in educational technology; training resource teachers; integrating databases and improved school management using EMIS.

Relative frequencies of each behavioural indicator and making comparisons across the three evaluation years. Differences by types of schools were also examined. Special indices were created to measure complex issues such as teaching quality. Where appropriate, statistics such as chi-square and correlations were used to examine relationships among the sample.

Observed in NHP activities during the year were oversampled. The final sample consists of 25 schools and 48 classrooms for intensive data collection and analysis. Each of the 72 NHP schools were matched retrospectively by size and by 1996 GSAT performance to a similar school in the same geographical area. The GSAT test results for each year for this group of schools were then compared to NHP schools.

Baseline data were complemented by the results of the third grade diagnostic tests and the sixth grade GSAT results for 2002.

Impact assessment through 'phased roll in methodology' over three years. In each school, five boys and five girls were randomly selected from each grade for inclusion in the study. In total, 70 children were recruited from 80 schools in Chadiza and Chipata Districts of Zambia’s Eastern Province. The biometrical and cognitive testing and treatment took place in the first set of 80 pilot schools over a three-year period. Of the 155 schools in the two districts, 80 were randomly selected for inclusion in the study. The schools Baseline data to document the prevalence of bilharzia, worms, and micronutrient deficiencies. Designated teachers and health workers attended training, received the tools, assessed the students, and significant increase in cognitive assessment scores for 2017 pupils. Children who received treatment improved significantly more than children in control schools. In 2001 more than 50 per cent of the schools had children with a high percentage of anemia and bilharzia infection, to which were added other problems such as malaria and malnutrition. Treating all students in a school for worm infestations (hookworms, roundworms) reduced the overall infection rate in the community by 80%. The follow-up surveys conducted in years two and three showed marked declines in students’ worm loads and bilharzia infection. When the Zambian Cognitive Assessment Instrument (ZCAI) was administered in 2001 and 2002, after one year (2002), children...
communities to address the wide range of health issues plaguing the country.

Each school (7 grades x 10 children each = 70 children). Each study group contained 1,400 children (20 schools x 70 children = 1400 children).

were randomly divided into four groups of 20 schools each. In the first year, pupils from 20 schools served as the intervention group that received SHN treatment, while those from another 20 formed a control group. In the second year, the pupils from 20 schools that had constituted the control group received SHN interventions while an additional cohort of pupils from 20 new schools constituted a new control group.

administered drugs during the school year. At the end of year one, data collected to document the results of the interventions. This was complemented by testing of participating students' cognitive ability.

who received interventions performed significantly better than those who did not (p<0.001). Further, in 2003, children who had received interventions for two years (2001 and 2002) were found to perform better than those who had received only one (2002 only). The results show that the impact of deworming is cumulative. Regular deworming has a greater impact on children’s educational ability than one time activities. The results also showed that the interventions acted to help correct the gender imbalance: the cognitive scores of girls receiving interventions increased significantly more than those of boys (p<0.05). Among children who had received deworming for one (2002 only) or two years (2001 and 2002), the prevalence of infection (number of children infected) with parasitic worms was approximately one quarter of the rate at baseline and was much lower than that of children in the control group (p<0.001) when data were controlled for differences such as age and sex. The overall Z-CAI scores of children at baseline (2001), in control and intervention groups, were much the same.

CETT teachers did better than non-CETT teachers. The teachers with one year of experience in 2006 were significantly more likely to be near mastery of key literacy components than were comparable CETT teachers in 2004. Duration of training was found to be an important factor; teachers with two or more years of CETT training compared with teachers who had only one year of training were more often categorized as being at or near mastery in most best practices sought. Differential instruction is considered the most difficult of all the best practices sought; in 2004, no CETT teachers were at near mastery or mastery levels, whereas in 2006, 30% of the teachers were providing some differential instruction to struggling students based on their diagnosed needs. The newly trained teachers were also more likely to teach fluency effectively, use resources well, to work with others to improve instruction, and they were more reflective about their practice. (Magnitude of difference not provided)
school level practices were aggregated by region. Best Practice Ratings Forms completed after observations and interviews with teachers were scored to determine levels or stages of teacher implementation of best practices. Comparisons were made across groups using chi-square analysis to examine the impact of professional development in each region, as well as trends for the entire CETT. These data were compared with data from the 2004 study. Interviews with CETT administrators, trainers and teacher focus groups were reviewed to identify and summarize key trends.

Table 5: Education sector budget support and pooled fund aid 2010 (constant 2010 US$m)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>US$m</th>
<th>% total</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SECTOR BUDGET SUPPORT</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (5% total aid to education sector)</td>
<td>723.259</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC:</td>
<td>335.312</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of which, the 6 largest bilaterals provide 43% SBS:</td>
<td>310.524</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia (18%); USA (11%); Spain (4%); Netherlands (3%); Norway (3%); UK (3%)</td>
<td>310.524</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>284.172</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>103.775</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>POOLED FUND AID</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (= only DAC) (2.7% of total aid to education sector)</td>
<td>365.344</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of which, the 6 largest bilaterals provide 93% Pooled Fund Aid:</td>
<td>338.081</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands (35%); Germany (21%); Canada (17%); Australia (8%); Sweden (7%); Ireland (6%)</td>
<td>338.081</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 6: Comparative amounts and shares of total aid by sector (constant 2010 US$)

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<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US$m %Total ODA</td>
<td>US$m %Total ODA</td>
<td>US$m %Total ODA</td>
<td>US$m %Total ODA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total ODA</td>
<td>57,556 100</td>
<td>83,744 100</td>
<td>141,229 100</td>
<td>163,608 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>2,888 5</td>
<td>6,377 8</td>
<td>8,490 6</td>
<td>13,299 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>2,399 4</td>
<td>4,129 5</td>
<td>7,176 5</td>
<td>9,215 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water and Sanitation</td>
<td>3,746 7</td>
<td>5,218 6</td>
<td>7,034 5</td>
<td>7,781 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government and Civil Society</td>
<td>3,820 7</td>
<td>7,400 9</td>
<td>14,743 10</td>
<td>18,403 11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>